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Abstract 
The Spanish party system after Francoism has been the subject of discussion of several 
academics and previous research. The purpose of this work is to approach this topic more deeply 
from a new perspective by paying attention to the shaping of ideology and voting patterns 
regionally and through time. This research has been structured into three main chapters. Firstly, 
a historical review of politics and key facts before the dictatorship has been carried out. 
Secondly, socioeconomic factors and voting patterns during the Second Republic have been 
analysed in detail. Thirdly, by focusing on insights acquired from previous chapters, several 
models of voting patterns and ideological shaping have been carried out from 1978 to 1994 at a 
national and regional level. The final conclusions show that (1) voting patterns and ideological 
identities after the dictatorship were still strongly influenced by lifelong social cleavages, (2) 
both voting patterns and ideological identities varied regionally, (3) preferences towards a 
democratic or authoritarian regimen did not affect voting and ideology after the dictatorship 
and (4) Francoism as a set of ideals still played an important role in defining voting patterns 
during the democratic era. 
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Introduction 
The academic discussion about the evolution of the party systems after authoritarian regimes is 
considerable and diverse. This interest is understandable not only because of the wide range of 
countries that underwent regime changes during the past century, but also because it happens 
in current century. Outstanding examples are the new democracies that emerged from the 
losing side of the Second World War, the regimen changes of Latin America during the middle 
of the 20th century or the current democracy processes in the Arab world. 
Several questions have emerged from the observation of such processes. Among the most 
relevant, the continuity issue (see Cotta, 1994), closely related to the "freezing" hypothesis of 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and the eventual effect of the dictatorship on the new party system 
stand out. The continuity issue poses the question of whether the new party system emerges 
with equivalent features to the previous one, similar to the "freezing" hypothesis since it 
assumes that the new party system is based on similar social cleavages over time. Moreover, 
the influence of the dictatorship states that the authoritarian regime affects post-dictatorship 
political alignments either on voting patterns, ideological identities or, even, the political parties. 
Although both ideas could seem mutually incompatible, they are not, since they are 
conceptually congruent. According to new explanations about the freezing hypothesis 
(Karvonen et al., 2000: pp. 24-25), the freezing of political alignments does not mean that old 
political alignments are really frozen, but that there is steadiness in such political alignments 
over time. Likewise, the influence of a dictatorship cannot affect the nature of the pre-
dictatorship political alignments; by contrast, it can involve and reinforce previous alignments 
during and after the dictatorship. Consequently, the influence of the dictatorship does not 
necessarily imply a change in the nature of cleavages, but it can affect their structure or 
relevance. 
Previous research has stated that political alignments and the party system undergo variations 
when they are institutionalised after an authoritarian regime. Such changes are, in some cases, 
a result of the reshaping of the party systems (see Cotta, 1994: 40) or the way in which cleavages 
are structured in East-Central Europe (see Bértoa, 2014).  
However, perhaps the most feasible influence of a dictatorship on a new party system is that it 
can affect the social preferences towards a democratic or an authoritarian regime. As some 
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academics have pointed out (Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Alvarez and Katz, 2009), some evidences 
illustrate that the dictatorship in Chile affected the preferences towards a democracy, which 
influenced voting patterns during the democratic era. 
As it can be seen, a post-dictatorship party system might not be completely unrelated to its 
authoritarian past. The post-dictatorship Spanish party system, purpose of this research, may 
bear a certain likeness to previous ones. Nonetheless, as previous research has revealed, there 
are substantial differences among cases depending on location or time, among other variables.  
For example, the Spanish case is fairly different from some European cases, such as Germany 
and Italy, but it is quite related to Greece and Portugal. Their differences lie in the way they 
achieved democratisation. Whilst the German and Italian democracies come from a war defeat, 
the Spanish democracy is a result of an internal process (Cotta, 1994:11).  
Moreover, the First and Second Republic were the last democratic governments before the 
failed military coup and the successive civil war that set up the Spanish dictatorship. Some of 
the parties which obtained parliamentary seats in 1936 also received a significant vote share in 
the new democratic elections of 1977. The natural democratic process and the survival of these 
parties for over forty years, unlike in Italy and Germany, facilitates the analysis of the possible 
influence of the dictatorship on reshaping of political alignments irrespective of further 
considerations. 
Research Objectives 
The purpose of this research is to analyse the development of post-dictatorship political 
alignments concerning voting patterns and ideological shaping during the Spanish democratic 
period from 1978 to 1994. The main objectives are (1) to reveal whether key variables and social 
cleavages after the dictatorship still defined voting patterns in democracy, (2) to show if there 
are remarkable differences in voting patterns and ideological identities by region or through 
time and (3) to study whether there was, or not, any kind of influence of the dictatorship on 
political alignments after the end of Francoism. 
Methodology and Structure  
The methodology of this research is based on three study methods. 
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Firstly, in chapter 1, a historical review from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 
Spanish Civil War in 1936 has been carried out. The main purpose was to highlight the most 
relevant political facts and the social and economic context from a spatial and temporal 
perspective. By highlighting such points, they can be used to determine the key variables of 
analysis and to test the continuity of political alignments in post-dictatorship democracy. 
Secondly, in chapter 2, descriptive socio-economic data over several years has been studied, as 
well as the vote distributions during the Second Republic by region and nationally. The objective 
was to identify relevant insights of socio-economic factors and eventual variations of voting by 
region or by year. 
Finally, in chapter 3, it has been carried out several models of voting patterns and ideological 
shaping regarding the insights arising from previous chapters, with the purpose of accomplishing 
the research objectives. Concretely, the data used for this research come from surveys from the 
Centro de Estudios Sociológicos (CIS: Sociological Research Centre) of 1978, 1981 in the Basque 
Country, 1983 in Catalonia, 1985 and 1994. For defining voting patterns, multinomial logit 
models of alternatives have been used. For defining ideological identities, multiple linear 
regressions on scalar axis of ideology have been used. 
CHAPTER 1. Historical Review 
 
1.1 Social and Political Context of the 19th Century 
The middle of the 19th Century allowed the emergence of new parties representative of the 
social junctures of the liberal era. The democratic periods were short and did not succeed in 
establishing a consolidated political system and in finding a real democratic game. The Sexenio 
Democrático (democratic six-year term), from 1868 to 1874, was the most relevant period in 
which the ideological currents of the century were consolidated as principal axes of the following 
political stage. In 1873, the parliamentary monarchy ended due to the abdication of Amadeo I 
and led to the proclamation of the short-lived First Republic of Spain. After one year marked by 
political instability owing to the struggles between republican centralists and federalists, internal 
riots and the Ten Years' War (Toro, 1997), the Republic was overthrown by a military 
government. The military power established and supported a two-party system called Bourbon 
Restoration, created to reinforce the monarchy and political stability. 
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This era was marked by continuous fights among royalist and republican parties, religious issues 
and the development of capitalism and the labour movement (Monlleó, 2001). Although the 
social context was extremely varied, the Spanish party system remained as a two-party system 
after the collapse of the First Republic in 1874. This period is known as the Bourbon Restoration 
and was characterised by the alternation of the Liberal party and the Conservative party in 
power, erasing a past of military governments and revolutions. 
 Ideologically, these two political parties supported liberal and royalist positions committed to 
maintaining the status quo but differing on conservative and progressive issues, in such manner 
that the Spanish party system did not completely reflect the social reality. While the alternating 
system stabilised Spain for a relatively long time, the agreement between liberals and 
conservatives provided a scenario in which political change was almost irrelevant. The political 
game between the Conservative and the Liberal party was based mainly on disagreements about 
state policies and the improvement of social rights. Their common goal was the strengthening 
of the Bourbon monarchy and the monopolisation of the political power (Lacomba, 1993: Boyd, 
2003).  
However, there were various social issues that were not represented by the abovementioned 
political parties and they would later arise in the form of riots, revolutions and military coups. 
The monarchy-republic cleavage that promoted the attempt to establish a long-life republic in 
1873 was an important feature of the Spanish society of that time. But the social conflict was 
not only between republicans and royalists; the liberal alliance, formed by the Conservative and 
the Liberal parties, had also been fighting over the century against the supporters of Carlos V 
and his heirs to the Spanish throne. The confrontation peaked three times (in 1833, 1846 and 
1872), when the Carlist Wars started in regions such as Catalonia, Aragon and the Basque 
Country. 
The Carlist movement represented the opposition to the liberal ideas of the French Revolution. 
Its main goal was to return to the Former Regime defeating the Bourbon monarchy and the 
liberal system. Even though the Carlist movement supported conservative positions, it was a 
mass movement. The three axes of its ideology were based on extreme Catholicism, Carlist 
monarchy and the defence of the local Fueros1 of specific regions of Spain, combined with a 
                                                          
1 The fueros were special laws and concessions granted to particular regions of Spain by the King or the 
State authority during the middle ages and onwards. Due to the crisis of the Ancient Regime and the 
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patriotic nationalism. The Carlist movement and its political branch, known as Comunión 
Tradicionalista, were a relevant political actor in subsequent years and before the Spanish Civil 
War of 1936. It was an important piece in the course of the alliances and disputes among the 
different political forces due to its power and capacity of mobilisation. 
The popular nature of this movement highlights important elements of the Spanish society and 
its configuration. Several academics have turned their attention to its character as a mass 
movement and its causes. One of the arguments is that the common people saw the liberal 
reforms as contrary to their interest, especially the land reform, and massively joined the riots 
against the liberal system (Boyd, 2003). Another argument refers to cultural reasons and the 
birth of the modern nationalism in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Navarra and Aragon, where 
the movement had the largest number of supporters (Gerard, 2014). According to these ideas, 
the mass element of the Carlist movement had its origin in a class conflict or in reasons related 
to the emerging nationalism, rather than in conservative reasons such as religion or monarchy 
issues. 
Although the Carlist movement had the ability to mobilise the social masses, it is doubtful that 
it was a real class struggle, as the Marxist literature defines it (Chodakiewicz & Radzilowski, 
2003). More likely, the social mobilisation of the Carlist movement was based on cultural and 
social issues rather than on materialistic reasons. However, the Carlist Wars affected the Spanish 
economy significantly, preventing the normal development of nation-building processes as 
happened in other European countries, such as Italy or France, during the 19th century. Hence, 
the economic slowdown caused by the Carlist Wars could have delayed the formation of a typical 
liberal system in Spain (Coller, 2004). 
The struggle of the Carlist movement for returning to the local Fueros was only one of the ways 
in which the problem of the Spanish territorial division arose. Other forms of territorial disputes 
emerged mixed with new ideologies. Cantonalism is a remarkable example of how territorial 
tensions were combined with anarchism, the labour movement or the federalist republicans 
during the short-lived Spanish First Republic. Cantonalism pursued the objective of obtaining 
wider territorial powers and, in some cases, the total independence of local entities and districts 
                                                          
establishment of a centralised liberal system in Spain at the beginning of the 19th century, new tensions 
arose between the followers of the centralised constitutionalism and the supporters of the old 
confederate monarchy (Alli-Aranguren, 1998). The royal dynasty issue also caused the split of the 
supporters of the Ancient Regime and the liberal system in followers of Carlos V and the Bourbon dynasty 
respectively, which laid the basis for the birth of Carlism (Alli-Aranguren, 1998: 56). 
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(López, 1992). There were armed insurrections in regions such as Cartagena and Salamanca, 
where new councils were formed to constitute independent governments of the Spanish First 
Republic.  
Nonetheless, the territorial cleavage also affected the Republican ideas by causing internal 
divisions (León & Porras, 2014). Two big groups of republicans, centralists and federalists, 
emerged both in government and in society. These political and social junctures caused military 
repression and a continuous change between monarchy, dictatorship and a republican form of 
government. 
The Spanish class cleavage began in the developed industry of Catalonia at the same time as the 
outbreak of the First Carlist War between 1830 and 1840. The first Spanish trade unions were 
weak organizations in which the workers cooperated occasionally. These workers' organizations 
were created around several class currents and they evolved into more complex ideologies, 
which resulted in a wide range of trade unions and political organizations. It was not until the 
founding of the First International in Spain during the second half of the 19th century that the 
workers movement became an important actor in the political game. The First International laid 
the groundwork for the birth of a strengthened Spanish labour movement thanks to the relative 
union of socialist, communist and anarchist sectors under the same flag. 
Perhaps the fact that best represented the reinforcement of the Spanish labour movement was 
the founding of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE; Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) 
and its trade union, called Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT; General Union of Workers), in 
1879 and 1888 respectively. This party and its related trade union still exist nowadays as the 
most relevant party and trade union of the left-wing sector in Spain and as the representation 
of the workers’ interests and their labour rights. The PSOE was originally founded as a Marxist 
party committed to defending the workers’ general interest and to introducing socialist means 
of production. Its performance was fairly irrelevant during the 19th century due to the limited 
industrialisation of the Spanish economy, what made it extremely difficult to reach its ideological 
aims through a well-consolidated worker base (Aguiar, 2006: 5). 
1.2 Beginning of the 20th Century 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Liberal and Conservative parties were forced to share 
the political spectrum with new political parties due to the rise of the labour movement and the 
birth of modern nationalism in regions such as the Basque Country and Catalonia (Anguera, 
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2001). The social and political context of the last century enabled the emergence of the Unión 
Republicana (UR; Republican Union) and the Carlist movement in the Spanish party system. 
Although, initially, these new parties lacked a big vote share compared with the Conservative 
and Liberal parties, it marked a breaking point in the previous two-party system committed to 
maintaining the status quo and the Bourbon monarchy. 
The first Republican pact took place in 1893 as an electoral alliance between the Centralist, 
Federalist and Progressive parties in the spirit of accelerating the process of establishing a 
Republic in Spain (Pabón, 1999). The success of the Republican alliance was notorious compared 
to previous national elections. The electoral alliance obtained 47 parliamentary seats in 1893; 
however, its life was short. The inability of the Republican alliance to establish a Republic by 
legal or insurrectional means resulted in its collapse in 1894 (Suarez, 2006). Nonetheless, the 
attempts to found a solid Republican alliance did not finish with the end of the electoral alliance 
in 1893. Another alliance was formed in 1900 and, finally, in 1903 the Union Republicana (UR) 
was constituted as a formal political party. 
Although the republican parties cooperated several times in electoral alliances or, even, formed 
party mergers, their internal divisions were constant. The republican Spain of that era had a 
large number of unitary, centralist and federalist parties. As happened in the last century, the 
issue of the territorial form of Spain was their main point of disagreement, causing the 
republican parties to be divided into various ideologies. Even since the end of the 19th century, 
the more federalist republican currents joined the rising nationalism of the Basque Country, 
Catalonia and Galicia (Beramendi, 2000). 
At the beginning of the 20th century, nationalism took a real political shape as can be seen from 
the founding in 1901 of the Lliga Regionalista and the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV; 
Nationalist Basque Party) in 1895. Unlike the previous nationalist parties (republican and labour 
parties), both the Lliga Regionalista and the PNV were conservative parties with a marked 
nationalist character. The Lliga Regionalista was a liberal and royalist party which had an 
important voice in the Spanish Senate during the first decades of the century (Molas, 2003), 
albeit the expanding labour movement and the left-wing nationalism undermined its power as 
head of the Catalonian nationalism over time. 
The founding of the PNV was the other relevant fact of the century. As it is the case with the 
PSOE, the PNV is a political party which still exists nowadays as an important piece of Spanish 
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politics and as the biggest representative of the Basque nationalism. The primary roots of the 
PNV were based on Catholic morality and the nationalism of the Basque Country (de Pablo, 
2000). Initially, the ideology of the PNV was very close to the Carlist ideas and it could be 
considered an evolution of it in the Basque Country. Its founder, Sabino Arana, was an old 
member of the Basque Carlist movement and, consequently, the traditionalist element of 
Carlism has been an important part of the ideological manifesto of the PNV during its evolution. 
Particularly, the social morality of Catholicism and the idea of a Basque race and blood were 
taken to build the ideological pillars of the PNV. Nevertheless, Basque Carlism (which had a large 
number of supporters in the Basque regions of Álava and Guipúzcoa) and the PNV started to 
quarrel a few years later due to disagreements about territorial issues. Whilst Basque Carlism 
believed in the return to the Fueros inside a national and royalist Spain, the PNV’s idea about 
the Basque Country aimed to establish a territory independent from Spain (Blinkhorn, 2008). 
The projects of the PNV for the Basque Country left aside the defence of the Ancient Regime, an 
idea supported by Carlism, and supported the idea of a federal organization of the Basque 
Country and a democratic government (Hobsbawm, 2012). 
At the same time as the founding of the PNV, the labour movement, represented by the PSOE 
and its trade union UGT, also gained support in the industrialised parts of the Basque Country. 
In the Basque Country, the development of the mining and metalworking industry since the 
Industrial Revolution resulted in labour migration flows on a large scale from the rest of Spain. 
Native workers from the Basque country had to live with workers from Castile and border 
regions. This caused a division in the political structure of workers. The Basque workers were 
employed in small factories and firms, whilst non-native workers were grouped in large factories 
(Kasmir, 1996).  
Hence, political membership was divided as well. The unskilled workers from non-Basque origin 
were more likely to sympathise with the PSOE and the UGT or other trade unions. On the 
contrary, the PNV attracted Basque unskilled and skilled workers from small factories and 
companies. The PNV was also linked to a trade union called Eusko Langileen Alkartasuna-
Soliradidad de Obreros Vascos (ELA-STV; Basque Workers' Solidarity) formed in 1911. Unlike the 
PSOE and the UGT, the ELA-STV rejected the class rhetoric considering it anti-Christian and anti-
Basque, consequently the syndical struggle focused on uniting the workers base to employers 
by extolling the Basque nationalism (Heiberg, 1989). Even today, the ELA-STV survives as the 
largest trade union in the Basque Country, although currently it does not formally belong to any 
political party. 
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As the case of the Basque Country showed, during the beginning of the 20th century new 
political forces and heirs to previous times are present in the Spanish political arena. The political 
actors formed as a result of the consolidation of the labour movement were, likely, the new 
players in the old political context of Spain and their relevance was notorious in the wake of the 
subsequent events. In contrast to preceding ideologies, the labour movement and its ideological 
branches, such as the communist, socialist and anarchist currents, were not completely formed 
inside the social context of Spain. That is, the labour movement was influenced and organized 
partially by the international ideas of thinkers such as Karl Marx and Mijaíl Bakunin (Aguiar, 
2006). However, that did not imply that class ideology later merged with the particular features 
of the Spanish society or that political alliances existed between new class groups and old 
political actors. 
After the labour movement organized its political action in the PSOE and the UGT, new 
ideological trends appeared from anarcho-syndicalist and anarcho-socialist sectors of the 
movement. At the end of 1910, the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT; National 
Confederation of Labour) was founded in Barcelona with the aim of consolidating the divided 
anarcho-syndicalism of Spain in a unique organization. Together with the UGT, the CNT is the 
largest syndical organization of contemporary Spain. While it is true that the CNT grew rapidly 
due to the incorporation of the anarchist labour movement in it, the purest ideological 
anarchism did not fit into the syndical ideas of the trade union (Porter, 2012). These 
discrepancies encouraged the formation, in 1927, of another anarchist organization devoid of 
the marked syndical element of the CNT called Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI; Iberian 
Anarchist Federation). Even though the FAI and the CNT had different responsibilities due to 
their decentralised organization, they behaved as a single entity in most of the main decisions 
against their opposition groups until the end of the Spanish Civil War.  
The ideological currents that appeared in the previous century took form in well-structured 
political parties and organizations and, gradually, were institutionalised in Spanish society. These 
organizations established partnerships and agreements eventually depending on the social and 
political circumstances. As has already been seen, in the first decades of the 20th century the 
old conservative, progressive and republican parties shared the political arena with political 
parties and organizations that emerged from the labour movement and the modern 
nationalism. Those relations of competition and cooperation within and among parties were 
shaping the factions that would ally during the Second Republic of Spain and during the course 
of the civil war. 
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A pertinent example of that is the electoral alliance between the PSOE and republican parties 
that took place in 1909. Even though this electoral alliance was the first long-term agreement 
between the PSOE and the republicans, there had already been some unproductive alliances 
between them at the end of the 19th century. According to Santiago Castillo (1990), the reasons 
behind the failing of the previous agreements were the disunity within the republicans with 
regard to objectives and political programme, the natural opposition of socialism to liberal 
parties, the struggle for the electorate, as well as personal discrepancies among their party 
leaders. Nevertheless, the alliance with the republican parties resulted in a substantial electoral 
victory of the PSOE-Republicans union, where they obtained a considerable number of 
councillors and increased the number of members in their trade union, the UGT.  
However, the alliance with the republican parties resulted in a change of ideology regarding 
social class and territorial issues. The bourgeoisie-worker cleavage turned into a republic-
monarchy division in which the class cleavage acquired a new sense within republican ideas and 
turned the PSOE into "another republican party" (Aguiar, 2006). This implied that the dogmatic 
statements of the international class struggle became a disagreement point between the 
traditional elite, represented by the monarchy and its supporters, and the social basis. 
Furthermore, the PSOE also had to cope with the territorial issue and had to define its position 
with regard to the situation of Catalonia and the Basque Country. Within the socialist ideals, the 
regional problem was more a bourgeois ambition than a central issue for the proletariat (Aguiar, 
2006). Anyway, since the vast majority of the workers were present in the industrialised regions 
of Catalonia and the Basque Country, the PSOE adopted a common position with the republican 
ideas considering those regions as oppressed by the monarchy and proposing a “Republican 
Confederation of Iberian Nationalities” (Aguiar, 2006: 6).  
The ideological change of the PSOE within the particular features of Spain and its distancing from 
the more theoretical ideals of Marxism also affected the internal unity of the party. As Juan 
Andrade (1979) stated, the beginning of the First World War marked the start of a debate about 
the position the party should adopt regarding the conflict. The PSOE was divided into followers 
of the international current and supporters of the allies, including the founder of the party, Pablo 
Iglesias, and his political allies. Whilst the main representatives of the PSOE supported the allied 
countries in the war, another sector of the party saw the war as an imperialist conflict far 
removed from the internationalism of the working class and its struggle. The Socialist Youth of 
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Madrid were the only ones associated to the Zimmerwald Conference2, where some sectors of 
socialism agreed that the war was not part of the labour movement. 
The Russian Revolution and, particularly, the founding of the Third International by the soviet 
government, also caused internal rifts within the party. The PSOE had been widely supporting 
the Second International since its formation in 1889 but the establishment of the Third 
International collided with the previous agreements. The Second International had typically had 
a large range of ideological trends, from the social democratic current to the purely Marxist, 
while the emerging Third International was constituted to implement the Marxist ideals as the 
Russian Revolution had begun to encourage. The social democratic leaders of the PSOE were 
opposed to accepting the lead of the USSR and the implementation of the claims of the Third 
International in Spain. However, the success of the Russian Revolution and the formation of the 
Third International increased the number of supporters of the labour movement (Andrade, 
1979). The committee of the Socialist Youth was renewed by young workers and intellectuals 
encouraged to follow the doctrine of the Third International. This resulted in a lack of 
understanding between old leaders of the PSOE and its youth branch. In the National Congress 
of 1919 the difference of votes for the acceptance of the Third International versus the Second 
International was minimal, albeit the new International was finally accepted. Nonetheless, the 
disagreement among partisans of both Internationals were constant, resulting in the split of the 
Socialist Youth and the PSOE. The Partido Comunista de España (PCE; Communist Party of Spain) 
is founded in 1920 by leaders of the Socialist Youth and with the international support of the 
USSR. 
In addition to the infighting of parties during the first years of the century, other political 
tensions had been growing between the Army and the political sphere. In 1923, the Army and 
Primo de Rivera, Captain General of Catalonia, acting as leader, seized power in a military coup. 
As some academics have pointed out (Ben-Ami, 1977; Casassas, 1983; Calleja, 2005), the 
dictatorship of Primo de Rivera was an attempt to the end the liberal system and to implement 
state policies to overcome the old and new political problems of the country. The military coup 
put an end to the weakened two-party system of the Restoration and encouraged the removal 
                                                          
2 The Zimmerwald conferences were held in 1915 and 1916 by representatives of different European 
countries. In the second conference the topics discussed were: the struggle to end the war, the attitude 
of the proletariat on the peace issue, agitation and propaganda, parliamentary activity, mass struggle and 
the convocation of the International Socialist Bureau (see, Lenin, 1964: 7). The Zimmerwald conferences 
launched a renewed Marxist internationalism that took shape in the Third International (see also, Lenin, 
1964: 7). 
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of the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties from political power. The aim of the 
dictatorship was to regenerate Spanish politics from top to bottom and vice versa. To achieve 
this, the dictatorship cooperated with the most relevant political actors of the social context.  
Particularly interesting are the links between the PSOE and the UGT and the dictatorship of 
Primo de Rivera, together with the approval by the PSOE of some policies implemented by the 
government. The support of the PSOE and the UGT in some social issues was due to the plan of 
the dictatorship to remove caciquismo3 from the political structure of the country, as well as to 
promote a social peace between different social actors. Unlike what happened with the CNT, 
outlawed by the dictatorship, the UGT was allowed to keep on performing its syndical activity.  
However, the real support of the dictatorship came from business associations, farmer groups, 
economic lobbies, the Church and parties such as the Partido Social Popular (PSP; Social People's 
Party), of catholic and right-wing tendency (Casassas, 1983: 30). These groups saw the 
dictatorship as guarantor of the economic stability, the status quo and their interests, which 
were threatened, especially, by new movements such as anarcho-syndicalism and communism. 
Furthermore, the other main pillar of the dictatorship on which the stability of the support of 
government rested was the monarchy and the support of King Alfonso XIII. As the 
aforementioned lobby groups, King Alfonso XIII also saw the dictatorship as the only chance to 
perpetuate the monarchy in the face of the crisis of the two-party system, which would cause 
the loss of support of the liberal system and the victory of the coup (Juliá, 1999).  
However, the dictatorship also had to cope with formal enemies and political opposition groups 
not satisfied with its policies and performance. The territorial policies of the dictatorship, 
inspired by the personalistic ideals of Primo de Rivera about the "Fatherland", were marked by 
a stronger centralist contrary to peripheral claims that had been developed over the last decades 
(Ben-Ami, 1977: 67). The dictatorship stifled the regionalist and pro-independence groups of the 
Basque Country and Catalonia and their political activity was forbidden.  
Moreover, the extreme left-wing parties and groups, such as the PCE or the anarchist trade 
union CNT, were repressed, thus interrupting their growth (Rey, 2006) and putting a stop to the 
                                                          
3 Caciquismo is understood as the political network of electoral clientelism developed in Spain during the 
Restoration. Caciquismo was stronger in local and rural areas compared to urban centres (Valera et al., 
2001). Moreover, caciquismo was often linked to rural economic power represented by landowners, who 
established clientelism networks with the peasantry (Moreno-Luzón, 2007). (See also, Guerrero, 1998). 
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number of strikes during the course of the dictatorship (Elorza, 1974). This situation favoured 
the economic groups by establishing what the dictatorship called "social peace". However, as 
has already been mentioned, the social stability was also achieved through negotiations 
between syndical socialism sectors and the dictatorship. The pacts and cooperation between 
the UGT, as well as the leaders of the PSOE4, and the government provided a way to 
communicate workers’ claims to the State. The other big enemy of the regime was caciquismo 
and its power on political life, society and the administration of the State. To the ideology of the 
dictatorship, caciquismo represented the first of the social ills which had to be eradicated (Rey, 
2006: 34). To this effect, Primo de Rivera replaced the mayors and senior officials of the public 
and local administration of the State, thus putting an end to the old links between the old liberal 
system and local corruption. 
Even though Primo de Rivera initially declared that the dictatorship was to last only for a short 
period until insuring political stability and the restoration of a strengthened democracy, the 
dictatorship lasted seven years without achieving a democratic restoration. Right from the 
beginning, the dictatorship had tried to implement a mass movement drawing inspiration from 
the Italian fascism of Mussolini. To that end, Primo de Rivera supported the formation of a party 
which would promote the acceptance of the dictatorship based on a "national mass movement" 
and on civil and social cooperation (Ben-Ami, 1977: 68). The resulting party was called Unión 
Patriótica (UP; Patriotic Union), of Catholic and royalist ideology. The UP was constituted as the 
only-party in the political arena. According to the original plans of Primo de Rivera, the UP should 
ensure a democratic restoration but, over time, the party turned into an anti-liberal and anti-
constitutional party. The UP did not get the support of the masses and the social bases as was 
initially planned.  
The "national mass movement" accomplished by Italian fascism was not possible in Spain. Primo 
de Rivera and King Alfonso XIII had focused on the Italian fascist movement as a model to be 
implemented in Spain (Casassas, 1983). The cooperation between Mussolini and the Italian king 
Victor Emmanuel III ensured the survival of the monarchy over the threat of Marxism and the 
new social movements of the era. Both Primo de Rivera and King Alfonso XIII relied on the 
success of the Italians to cope with the problems of their country. But Primo de Rivera did not 
completely adopt the structure and ideals of Italian fascism. As Leandro Alvarez Rey points out 
                                                          
4 E.g., the cooperation of Largo Caballero, General Secretary of the UGT, in the Council of State for the 
representation of chiefs and workers (See, Andrés-Gallego, 1977). 
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by mentioning previous scholars' findings (2006: 30), the Spanish dictatorship was rather an 
authoritarian regime with some fascist features than a pure fascist system.  
The lack of social support made a dent in the sustainability of the dictatorship. The support of 
the dictatorship by the military and the monarchy had been decreasing over the years. The 
supporters of the dictatorship were only small political and social sectors with strong right-wing 
ideals (Rey, 2006: 44). Additionally, the dictatorship had also lost the ability to cooperate with 
other political actors, as was the case with the socialist opposition in previous years. All of this 
resulted in the resignation of Primo de Rivera and the fall of the dictatorship in 1930, giving way 
to a short-lived government formed to restore democracy, which ended one year later as a result 
of the founding of the Second Republic of Spain. 
1.3 Second Republic of Spain and Civil War 
With the beginning of the Second Republic, the foregoing political and social conflicts were 
defining the future frame of the Spanish political system. As José Ramón Montero Gibert stated 
(1983: 103), in the Second Republic of Spain coexisted four main conflicts: the political system 
issue, with a polarisation of republicans against royalists; the territorial issue about a centralised 
o decentralised Spain; the class struggle between workers and the bourgeoisie and the religious 
issues among religion supporters and secularists. Even though these conflicts are not strictly 
interrelated, some axes of struggles, such as the religious issues (Gibert, 1983: 104), interacted 
and overlapped largely with other cleavages. 
After the fall of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and the weakening of its following regime, 
King Alfonso XIII tried to restore the previous democratic system through an interim government 
formed by royalist sectors and personalities from the old Liberal and Conservative parties. This 
transitional government held local elections in 1931, which resulted in a landslide victory of the 
electoral alliances between republicans and socialists in urban centres. By contrast, the royalist 
parties obtained the majority of municipal governments in rural areas.  
The first elections of the Second Republic, held in 1931, months after the local elections, also 
resulted in a victory of the republican ideals led by the coalition between the socialist, 
represented by the PSOE and the Partido Republicano Radical (PRR; Radical Republican Party), 
contrary to other parties such as the Partido Republicano Radical Socialista (PRRS; Radical 
Socialist Republican Party), the newly founded Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC; 
Republican Left of Catalonia), the Acción Republicana (AR; Republican Action) and the Derecha 
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Liberal Republicana (DLR; Liberal Republican Right). All these political parties, with the exception 
of the PSOE, were new republican organizations established in the last years of the dictatorship 
of Primo de Rivera. It is worth noting the weakness of purely right-wing parties in the first 
elections of the Republic; it will not be until the second elections when a proper right-wing 
current starts to appear.  
However, the majority of the political parties of the Second Republic had a marked reformist 
character, either on the republic-monarchy cleavage or on other conservative positions such as 
the religious issues. For example, the PRR was a political party of Catholic-left tendency, but the 
reformist elements, such as its republican character, affected its union with more secular 
republican parties such as the PSOE and the AR of Manuel Azaña. This caused government 
instability in the first term of the Republic, known as "reformist biennium". Manuel Azaña was 
elected prime minister thanks to the support of the socialists and the PRR; nevertheless, the 
PRR’s support to the government of Azaña and the socialists was decreasing. At the end of 1931, 
its leader, Alejandro Lerroux, left the government of the union of republicans and socialists. The 
PRR adopted a central position and became closer to right-wing parties in the course of the 
Republic.  
Another relevant actor was the ERC, founded in 1931, which obtained approximately 32 seats 
for Catalonia in the general elections of 1931. As Linz stated (1967: 258), Catalonia was mainly 
anarchist and supporter of the CNT, what explains why several anarchist votes (despite its anti-
liberal ideology) ended up in the ERC candidacies. The emergence of the ERC was a setback for 
the Lliga Regionalista because the Catalonian territorial issue was divided into two parties that 
contended for the power. The most conservative parties at the beginning of the Second Republic 
were only the DRL, later renamed as Partido Republicano Progresista (PRP; Republican 
Progressive Party), and the PRR which, despite of its reformist character in the progressive spirit 
of the Second Republic, kept conservative positions, especially on religious issues, as was shown 
by the split of both DRL/PRP and PRR and the socialists and the more progressive republicans, 
AR, in the first years of the Republic. The work of Fernández (1999) analyses the real bases and 
support of the DRL/PRR, establishing that most supporters came from the middle and skilled 
social classes (Fernández, 1999: 165). Even if it is true that the DRL/PRP also had support from 
the lower classes, according to Fernández, these sectors were influenced by the still existing 
caciquismo, which encouraged the peasantry to give their vote to a political party related to the 
interest of the “caciques” (Fernández, 1999: 166).  
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These patterns of vote are correlated with the political and economic structure of caciquismo. 
Rural Spain was formed by small and medium landowners, who formed the economic fabric of 
farming areas. This economic power also influenced the political power. Commonly, the 
landlords held the political power of the area by influencing the peasantry that worked for them. 
This way of political control led the political ideology of rural areas towards a conservative and 
right-wing way of thinking (Romero, 2000; de Pablo, 1990; Gómez, 1993) that considered the 
new movements, such as socialism, to be opposed to their economic interest and social ideas. 
As has been already seen, caciquismo was also linked to the old two-party system of the royalist 
Restoration, represented by the Liberal and Conservative parties. With the establishment of the 
Second Republic, both the previous party system and caciquismo finally came to an end due to 
the actions of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera against them and to the rise of new political 
forces such as socialism and republicanism (Juliá, 1996). However, the conservative and right-
wing groups heirs to caciquismo and the prior political structure were focusing on new forces 
and parties during the Second Republic. The landlords joined forces with agrarianism5 to create 
associations and political parties such as the Partido Agrario Español (Agrarian Spanish Party) 
and the Confederación Nacional Católico-Agraria (CNCA; National Catholic-Agrarian 
Confederation). One of the most relevant formations which emerged due to this reshaping was 
the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA; Spanish Confederation of 
Autonomous Right-wing Groups) which was joined by most agrarian-conservative groups over 
the course of the Second Republic. 
Despite the inclusion of sectors from previous parties and ideological groups, the CEDA was a 
new element in the Spanish political arena. The ideological roots of the CEDA have been 
compared frequently to the Christian Democratic Party, to a clerical-fascist party or to a mix 
between them (see Linz, 1967: 245). Its ideology has been discussed largely by several authors 
(e.g. Linz, 1967; Gibert, 1983; Rey, 1993; Jackson, 2012) determining as common idea that its 
main ideological axes rested on Catholic ideals rather than a pure Catholic fascism, as later 
emerges due to the birth of the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (JONS; Unions of the 
                                                          
5 Although some sectors of agrarianism and the conservative right-wing joined forces, agrarianism took 
different forms along the Spanish ideological spectrum. As Jiménez-Sanchez (1987: 215) states, during the 
20s and 30s of the 20th century Spanish agrarianism was characterised, generally, by (1) the consideration 
of agriculture a as "key element of production", (2) "the happiness of the homeland", (3) the disregard of 
the policies carried out previously (3) and (4) the opposition to the "cacique". Moreover, agrarianism 
ranged from technical ideals, socialism and collectivism (understood in this case as anarchism) to social-
Catholic and fascist ideologies (Cuadrado, 2006: 21). Nonetheless, according to Cuadrado (2006: 24), 
agrarianism was mainly conservative due to the mobilisation of the peasantry to defend their interests 
influenced by the Church and the landowners. 
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National-Syndicalist Offensive) and the Falange Española (FE; Spanish Falange), which formed 
the National Catholic Movement of Franco's dictatorship. If it is true that the CEDA was formed 
around Catholic ideals, the other key points of view that existed in the Spanish society caused 
disagreements in some occasions. Firstly, the monarchy or republic issue arose when the CEDA 
won the second elections of the Republic in 1933 together with the PRR, the Partido Agrario 
Español (PAE; Spanish Agrarian Party) and the Renovación Española (RE; Spanish Restoration), 
with a marked royalist character.  
This victory gave way to a right-wing government of republican, confessional and royalist 
political parties. To understand this alliance and why sometimes they represented opposite 
interests, as was later the case due to the establishment of the alliance called Frente Popular 
among left-wing parties, it is important to take into account the social context and events of the 
first government of the Second Republic.  
Firstly, turning to the agrarian problem, the rural world became a main issue for policies pursued 
by the Republic. As Jiménez-Sanchez (1987) points out, the agrarian vote was not only for the 
right-wing ideologies; in the southwest of Spain the vote was socialist, the small landowners of 
Castile and Navarra voted for right-wing parties, and the centrist parties obtained the rural vote 
in regions with medium landowners (Jiménez-Sanchez, 1987: 225). Consequently, the agrarian 
issue and the Agrarian Reform Law became a political matter due to the heterogeneity of the 
Spanish peasants and landowners (Jiménez-Sanchez, 1987: 225). This caused a standstill of the 
negotiations to define a common agrarian law until its final implementation in 1933. It is at the 
end of the first government of socialists and republicans when the rural world was divided into 
two because of the failure of the agrarian policies. In the words of Jiménez-Sanchez (1987: 226), 
the combination of factors created two trends in the countryside: (1) the radicalisation of the 
peasantry in the southwest, the increase of strikes, the anarcho-syndicalist uprisings in 1933, 
the invasions of lands and the violent social conflicts, the rebelliousness of local syndicalism, (2) 
the increase of conservatism in Castile, Navarra and another regions of small and medium 
landowners. One fifth of the Spanish peasantry in the 2500 rural municipalities of Castile and 
Aragon gave their vote in the local elections to the CEDA candidacies. 
Secondly, another crucial point was the religion and the relationship within the State and 
society. The Republican Constitution of 1931 established the secularism of the State and the 
separation between Church and State. It was the first time in the Spanish constitutionalism that 
the State was declared secular. The republican reforms affected the previous social and political 
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status of the Catholic Church and jeopardised the power of the Church in Spain. As Lago (2013: 
28) states, the Republic ended the national-Catholic model financed during previous years, tried 
to limit the power of the regular clergy that had become the spearhead of Catholicism in the last 
decades and, as it had happened with new republics, it could have triggered acts of violence 
against church representatives.  
The government of socialists and republicans, led by Manuel Azaña, implemented several 
policies that were contrary to previous church rights. The secularisation of cemeteries, the 
decrease of government funding for the clergy, the reform of the educational policies and, most 
importantly, the suppression of religious orders such as the Jesuits, which had become the 
scapegoats for anticlerical measures in Catholic countries (Jackson, 2012: 59), are some 
examples which caused political tensions to increase. All these factors encouraged the formation 
of a political option able to cope with the policies contrary to the interest of Catholicism, which 
took form in the CEDA (Lagos, 2013).  
The military reform carried out by the government also caused tensions between the supporters 
of the Republic and the supporters of the previous regime. The strategic policy of the first 
government of republicans and socialists regarding the army forces was to force its members to 
take an oath of allegiance to the Second Republic or to be retired with an allowance and, in some 
cases, to be removed from power positions in the military. These policies, along with the 
increase of the religious reforms, were regarded as anti-patriot policies and were considered to 
be against the concept of Spain by large sections of the population and by many political factions 
(Jackson, 2012: 480). The attempt of the government of the Republic to hand over military 
power to the civil and political world only caused a rift with some influential sectors of the army 
(Jackson, 2012). 
Nationalism was the cause of the political discrepancies among the different political tendencies 
regarding the territorial model of the State. The development of regionalism during the previous 
century and the strengthening of political nationalism encouraged the political forces of that era 
to take action on it. According to Beramendi (2003: 12-16), the political ideologies had the 
following stance on the territorial issue: (1) right-wing and extreme right-wing parties opposed 
any process of decentralisation, which they saw as a fragmentation of the country, only the 
traditionalists defended their peculiar territorial model; (2) republicanism, for its part, was 
divided in two ideas: unitarism, overall, centralism of the PRR and (3) republican-conservative 
groups and regional republicans believed on a new autonomic model.  
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However, as Beramendi states (2003: 13), the idea of territorial model supported by the 
republicans was very limited, as the final outcome of the Republican Constitution (an integral 
State) illustrated. The PSOE’s position was similar to that of the regional republicans, although 
its ideology had changed since previous years because, during the Republic, the PSOE did not 
have a clear position in favour of federalism. The PCE, in accordance with its ideological stance, 
rejected the Republic because of its bourgeois qualities and supported the revolution but, 
although its ideological programme was influenced by the Leninist principle of self-
determination of nations, its political power in the development of the new political system was 
negligible. In contrast, the anarchists had influence but their beliefs against the political power 
caused them not to engage in the constituent process of the Second Republic (Beramendi, 2003: 
14). The rejection of the bourgeois nationalism and the defence of an anarchist federalism from 
a top down perspective caused the main anarchist organization of Spain, the CNT, to decline to 
defend the proclamation of the Republic of Catalonia in 19316 since the CNT considered itself "a 
universal and Spanish political party" (Beramendi, 2003: 15).  
The main nationalist currents of the Second Republic remarkable by their political importance 
were in Galicia, Catalonia, the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent, in Navarra, where they 
were strongly related to the Basque nationalism and their historical ties.  
Galician nationalism, unlike Basque and Catalan nationalism, lacked outreach in the Galician 
society, what caused, as well, a lack of influence and it was only due to the consolidation of the 
Partido Galleguista (PG; Galician Party) that it achieved a relevant prominence (Antuña-Souto, 
2000: 419). Although Galician nationalism was young compared to its Catalan and Basque 
counterparts, the establishment of the Second Republic and the new Constitution that allowed 
the statutes of autonomy helped it grow rapidly (Antuña-Souto, 2000: 428). Galician nationalism 
was single-heartedly integrated in a federalist position at the start of the Second Republic 
(Beramendi, 2003: 15) but in successive years, partly owing to its multi-ideological composition, 
the PG split into a right-wing sector that will constitute the Dereita Galleguista (DR; Galician 
Right) and a left-wing sector that will join the republican and left-wing parties (united under the 
Frente Popular) since they were the main supporters of the federal model (Antuña-Souto, 2000).  
                                                          
6 The Republic of Catalonia was an informal stance of the first president of the Catalan government, 
Francesc Macià, after the regional elections of 1931 in which his party, the ERC, obtained the greatest 
number of votes. After negotiations with representatives of the interim government of the Second 
Republic, it was agreed that the name for the government of Catalonia formed after the new statute of 
autonomy would be Generalitat instead of republic (see Soldevilla, 1977). 
 25 
The Catalan case was, by far, the first sign of the emergence of a formal nationalism in Spain. In 
the early years of the 20th century, Catalan regionalism developed into nationalism and the 
change of national sense of the Catalan bourgeoisie laid the ideological basis and provided the 
necessary resources for the birth and the social growth of the Catalan nation in the strict sense 
of the term (Beramendi, 2003: 7). However, the historical evolution of Catalan nationalism did 
not follow a common path during its development. The Lliga Regionalista formed from the first 
regionalist parties had a marked conservative character, as well as a social sector highly 
differentiated since several of its senators belonged to the industry and the bourgeoisie (Mola, 
2003). As has already been stated, the rapid growth of the Catalan industry caused the rise of 
the labour movement and divided the society of Catalonia in different ideological trends which 
converged in different political parties. This caused the Catalan nationalism to also be divided 
with regard to different issues unrelated to the territorial problem. The clearest example is the 
weakness of the Lliga Regionalista at the beginning of the Second Republic in favour of the 
nationalists and leftists represented by the ERC. According to Beramendi (2003: 8), the loss of 
hegemony by the Lliga Regionalista at the dawn of the Second Republic was due to (1) the 
indispensable collaboration of the Lliga Regionalista and the central government for coping with 
the labour movement, (2) the radicalisation of the Catalan nationalism caused by the repression 
during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and (3) the mistake of supporting the continuity of 
the monarchy in 1930, resulting in the Catalan nationalism shifting towards the left.  
Even though the Lliga Regionalista and the conservative nationalism had lost power, the 
nationalist left was divided into separatists, confederalists, federalists and the supporters of the 
autonomy model (Beramendi, 2003: 16). In the regional elections held in 1931, the ERC won in 
Catalonia to the detriment of the political parties of national scope and the royalists. After the 
announcement of the Republic of Catalonia by the newly formed Catalan government and the 
agreement with the central government about the future of the territorial model and the 
responsibilities of the Catalan government (see note 6), the interim government of the Second 
Republic reached stability to consolidate the new regime thanks to the support of most of the 
political forces, including the major part of the ERC, which preferred the consolidation of the 
Republic to the radical defence of the Catalan nationalism (Beramendi, 2003: 18). 
In the Basque country, during the first few days of the Republic, the process of creating a statute 
of autonomy began at the initiative of the PNV and with the support of the right-wing party 
Comunión Tradicionalista. This alliance between the PNV and the Comunión Tradicionalista was 
born in the local elections. In words of Beramendi (2003: 26), this alliance happened as a result 
of the traditional and anti-democratic ideals of the PNV, as opposed to the other main coalition 
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of republicans, socialists and Eusko Abertzale Ekintza-Acción Nacionalista Vasca (EAE-ANV; 
Basque Nationalist Action)7, which polarized the Basque society. The original idea was to create 
a common statute for the three regions of the Basque Country: Álava, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, 
as well as Navarra. Initially, this project known as Estatuto de Estella had the support of the vast 
majority of Basque councils and from Navarra, formed mainly by right-wing parties and the 
Comunión Tradicionalista (De Pablo, 1988: 42). This statute, that unified the Basque regions and 
Navarra, fulfilled the nationalism aspirations of integrating the future region into the Republic 
as an independent identity with its own competencies.  
However, the final approval of this statute by the Republican Courts was hampered by some of 
its items, especially the religious issue. The amended Statute of Autonomy of 1931 for the 
Basque Country and Navarra, besides self-functions of governing, included strong competencies 
in religious matters and future arrangements with the Vatican. After the endorsement of the 
Republican Constitution of secular nature, the Parliament rejected the Basque and Navarra 
Statute and forced it to comply with the constitutional framework. The PNV and their Carlist 
allies rejected the new Republican Constitution because it established an integral state and a 
secular state (Beramendi, 2003: 30). According to De Pablo (2000), the PNV was not completely 
integrated in the Spanish Party System during the Second Republic, which was also the case with 
this party during the Restoration. The PNV was not willing to support a project for Spain that 
was irrelevant to its nationalistic hopes and not even positive in other matters, such as the 
religious issue (De Pablo, 2000: 87).  
Religion was the main cause for the disengagement of the PNV and the Spanish right-wing 
parties from the Spanish Parliament and the rejection of the Republican Constitution. The PNV 
had an ambivalent position concerning its political alliances. After the defeat of the Basque and 
Navarra Statute in 1931, the PNV tried to target its political discourse and actions to achieve the 
Basque independence or autonomy. This political position was gradually distancing itself from 
right-wing political parties and approaching a central position (De Pablo, 2000: 88). Concerning 
the asturian miners' strike of 1934, the PNV supported the republican government of centre-
right whilst, during the last republican government and in the last years before the Spanish Civil 
                                                          
7 The EAE-ANV was formed by the progressive ideological currents of the PNV against the conservative 
and religious spirit of the political party (see Granja-Saiz, 2002). 
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War, it supported the left-wing government and the Frente Popular in order to bring the Basque 
Statute to fruition8 (De Pablo, 2000: 89).  
Likewise, the PNV also changed its policy of alliances with Catalan political parties. Due to the 
aforementioned political shift from right to left-wing, the PNV went from being close to the Lliga 
Regionalista to approach the ERC, although it never felt completely identified with neither of 
them, only with the Unió Democrática de Catalunya (De Pablo, 2000: 89). On the contrary, the 
EAE-ANV was involved in the administration of the Republic. Unlike the PNV, the EAE-ANV was 
always a loyal ally of the Republican parties. The EAE-ANV joined the republican-socialist 
coalitions in 1931 and was part of the Frente Popular in 1936. The PNV and the EAE-ANV had 
different ideas regarding the Basque independence process. According to De la Granja-Saiz 
(2008: 605), the aim of the EAE-ANV was to achieve a Basque independence in the long run 
rather than in the immediate future. As De Pablo (2000: 89) states, this was also the goal of the 
PNV, but with the difference that the ideals of the PNV did not match the Republican ideologies. 
The autonomic trends did not only exist in regions such as Catalonia, Galicia, the Basque Country 
and Navarra. At the beginning of the Second Republic, several efforts toward the independence 
or autonomy emerged in places such as Valencia, Aragon, Andalusia and the Balearic Islands.  
In Valencia, during the first days of the Republic, the main regional ideologies and parties formed 
alliances with republicans or royalists. The right-wing and conservative political party was the 
Unió Valencianista (UV; Valencian Union). By contrast, the Agrupació Valencianista Republicana 
had emerged in the preceding months as a regional party ideologically close to the ERC 
(Beramendi, 2003: 23). As happened in Catalonia, the UV formed an alliance with the royal 
parties whilst the Agrupació Valencianista Republicana formed an alliance with the republicans 
in the local elections of 1931. Nonetheless, they were not the only representatives of Valencian 
regionalism. The Partido de Unión Republicana Autonomista (PURA; Party of Autonomist 
Republican Union) was the main representative of the autonomism of Valencia. Even though the 
PURA was the spearhead of the regional wishes of Valencia, political corruption scandals and 
the progressive change to right-wing weakened the political party during the Second Republic 
(Beramendi, 2003). In 1934, the PURA split forming the Esquerra Valencianista, of left-wing 
                                                          
8 It was not until the beginning of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 when the Basque Statute of Autonomy 
was adopted. Previously, different reasons, such as the disagreements between the nationalist parties 
and the national right-wing parties, had caused the stalling of the process. 
 28 
ideals. Later, other splits from the PURA led to the founding of the Acción Nacionalista 
Valenciana, of religious nature, as was the case of the PNV in the Basque Country (Beramendi, 
2003: 64). All these factors resulted in the establishment of two political trends in Valencia: the 
left-wing, formed by the Esquerra Valenciana, the Agrupació Valencianista Republicana 
(socialists as well as republicans), and the PURA formed by the Acción Nacionalista Valenciana 
and the CEDA (Beramendi, 2003: 48-65). Finally, the political scandals led to the disappearance 
of the PURA from the political arena at the end of the Second Republic before the regionalist 
forces reached a consensus to draft a statute of autonomy and to implement it.  
Similarly to the Valencian case, the efforts to successfully implement the autonomic process 
were stalled in Andalusia, the Balearic Islands and Aragon. In Andalusia and Aragon, the 
misgivings about the future of the autonomy as well as the indifference of some local councils 
and political forces led the process to failure. In the Balearic Islands, the division of the 
regionalist political parties in right and left-wing, along with the limited social support of the 
autonomy, caused the regional political forces to merge with the main national right-wing and 
leftist parties (Beramendi, 2003: 50). 
Moreover, the emergence of the peripheral autonomies was a directly strengthened Spanish 
nationalism and the opposition of some regions, such as Castile or Madrid. Especially, the strong 
territorial aspirations of Catalonia resulted in the emergence of an important anti-catalanism in 
Castile (Beramendi, 2003: 31). The CEDA and the royalists, who had a considerable presence in 
Castile, adopted a middle political position regarding the autonomies issue, what helped them 
attract votes from the conservative sectors of Castile and from regional right-wing parties in 
Valencia and Aragon (Beramendi, 2003: 51). The political position in relation to the central 
territorial issue of the CEDA would be reinforced due to the victory of the right-wing and 
conservative parties in the general elections of 1933. 
Even so, some right-wing parties such as the Lliga or the Comunión Tradicionalista entered the 
parliament in a stronger position. In addition, the PNV became the main political force of the 
Basque Country compared to the leftist parties. The governing coalition between the CEDA and 
the PRR was the main rival against the peripheral nationalism, both of left and right-wing. During 
the second government of the Spanish Republic, as has already been mentioned, there existed 
political tensions amongst the central government, caused by the proclamation of the Republic 
of Catalonia and the rejection of the Basque statute of autonomy. As Beramendi (2003: 55-58) 
stated, the territorial issue made a dent in the union amongst the conservative parties, what 
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bridged the gap between the left and the PNV or the PG and the Frente Popular at the beginning 
of the Civil War. Similarly, it also caused the loss of social support for the political parties that 
cooperated with the central government, as was the case of the Lliga on the proclamation of 
the Republic of Catalonia. 
1.4 The Radicalisation in the Second Republic 
At the dawn of the Second Republic, the royalist, conservative and right-wing political parties 
(except those from Catalonia, the Basque Country or Navarra) had not consolidated an 
organisation for coping with the rise of the left-wing political parties. As has already been stated, 
over time, the CEDA brought together the old Catholic and conservative sectors from the 
royalists or the agrarians, among others. Nonetheless, the CEDA was not the only party 
defending those ideals. Other parties and political organisations emerged to defend specifically 
those interests, as the royalist Renovación Española, or to adopt extreme positions, as the 
Falange Española.  
Spanish fascism, as happened with communism, was a minor force compared to the political 
parties which existed in the political arena of that time (Linz, 1967: 251-254). Likewise, Spanish 
fascism presented particular features that distinguished it from the fascism of Central Europe. 
These differences with Central European fascism were mainly based on the patriotic 
traditionalism, particularly strong in the middle class of Castile and among the northern 
peasantry (Payne, 1985: 29). By way of example, from the point of view of Payne (1985: 29), 
Carlism was the best example of this patriotic traditionalism in which their ideals were based on 
defending the ancient power of the Catholic Church and a non-constitutional monarchy at odds 
with modern patriotism, which pursued the achievement of new glories for the country. 
The roots of Spanish national syndicalism developed at the same time in Madrid and Castile. 
Before the fall of the monarchy in 1931, Ramiro Ledesma Ramos founded a paper called La 
Conquista del Estado in Madrid inspired by Italian and German fascism. For its part, Onésimo 
Redondo Ortega created the Juntas Castellanas de Actuación Hispánica (JCAH; Castilian Unions 
of Hispanic Action) also inspired by German National Socialism but keeping the Catholic thought 
as key point of its political ideology (Payne, 1985: 30). These two new groups of national 
syndicalism lacked relevant social support during their first months of life. Although the national 
syndicalism of Ledesma and the JCAH of Redondo greatly differed on the Catholic issue, both 
were nationalist and anti-Marxist revolutionaries (Payne, 1985: 31). The economic hardship of 
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the group of Madrid and the isolation of the national syndicalists of Castile contributed to the 
merge of both groups in 1931 by founding the JONS (Payne, 1985: 31). 
However, in the mid-Republican era, a new national-syndicalist force with features of Italian 
fascism arose in Spain. This new force was the Falange Española, which had as its leader the son 
of the dictator Primo de Rivera, José Antonio Primo de Rivera. Although the FE was a fascist 
party and José Antonio Primo de Rivera himself used the typical fascist discourse to define his 
political ideas (see Payne, 1985: 59-61), he brought back the defence of the monarchy to the FE 
ideology as a way of honouring his father against the Republican forces (Linz, 1967: 254). The FE 
grew rapidly as a result of the leadership of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, who attracted 
supporters from conservative, royalist and right-wing sectors (Payne, 1985: 54). In 1934, the FE 
and the JONS started talks for a merge, which crystallised forming the Falange Española de las 
JONS (FE de las JONS). 
As has been mentioned, the right-wing political spectrum in the new Spanish Republic was 
composed by the emerging National-Syndicalist forces, the royalist Renovación Española and 
the CEDA.  
Although the abovementioned political forces cooperated in the last days of the Republic and 
during the Spanish Civil War, they had disagreements about several ideological issues. The FE de 
las JONS, under the leadership of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, was defining its political 
positions on the most relevant issues during the course of the Republic. It should be noted that 
its economic position was based on an economic reform that the party itself called 
revolutionary. This economic reform intended to include both the agrarian reform and the 
nationalisation of bank credit, among others (Payne, 1985: 98). This revolutionary character, by 
contrast, were not in line with the conservative and bourgeois mind of the CEDA. The social and 
economic revolution resulted in some contacts between the FE de las JONS and the most 
moderate sectors of the CNT in order to state a vague declaration of principles on these issues 
(Payne, 1985: 103-104).  
The discrepancies among the CEDA and the FE de las JONS were evident during the second 
government of the Republic by the conservative coalition between the CEDA and the PRR. 
According to Payne (1985: 104), the conservative government was as harsh with the left-wing 
extremism as with the FE de las JONS. The conservative government usually shut down its 
propaganda media and its local branches due to the violent events caused by the party. Even 
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though the FE de las JONS shared some points of view with the government on conservative 
positions, such as patriotic nationalism or cultural traditionalism, on the economic and social 
fields it was as radical, as well as anti-bourgeois and anti-liberal, as the socialists and anarchists 
(Payne, 1985: 59-67). In 1933, José Antonio Primo de Rivera was elected representative in the 
Spanish Congress. During his tenure, he criticised the conservative government of the CEDA and 
the PRR because of the political corruption scandals and its failure to carry out a proper agrarian 
reform. In addition to the criticism against the main conservative parties, the lack of support to 
the monarchy and its idea about the separation of Church and State9 caused the loss of support 
from conservative sectors (Linz, 1967: 255). The FE de las JONS was persecuted by almost all the 
main political forces of the Republic, irrespective of their political ideology. By the end of the 
Republic, the FE de las JONS was forced to make contact with the Carlists and the Army but these 
contacts did not yield the expected outcome (Linz, 1967: 255). With the advent of the Civil War, 
the FE de las JONS and the political branch of Carlism, the Comunión Tradicionalista, would be 
integrated into the National Movement10 of Franco. This new force would be the only party in 
the one-party state during the dictatorship, called Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las 
Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (FET de las JONS). 
According to Linz (1967: 251-257), the fascists of the FE de las JONS as well as the communists 
of the PCE were two minority forces in Spain that lacked a mass appeal compared to other 
political parties as the CEDA, the PSOE or the CNT. Firstly, the strong tradition of anarcho-
syndicalism widely attracted the working class bases at the expense of fascists and communists. 
Secondly, the CEDA and the PSOE attracted, respectively, more antirevolutionary and religious 
sectors or reform supporters on most moderate positions than the FE de las JONS and the PCE. 
The modest bases of the PCE came mainly from underprivileged farmers of underprivileged 
regions (Linz, 1967: 256). Furthermore, the trade union branch of the PSOE organised under its 
leadership the majority of the remaining underprivileged farmers and kept in the party the 
middle-class intellectuals, who might otherwise have joined the PCE, as a result of its reformist 
political program (Linz, 1967: 257). It should be highlighted, as well, that another important fact 
                                                          
9 The FE de las JONS defined in its political statement the strong link between Spain and the Catholic 
dogma but it stated that the State and the Church must be separate to avoid interference of the Church 
in State matters (see Diaz-Plaja: 1972). 
10 The National Movement was the set of ideals, institutions and social organisations established by 
Francoism to rule and lead the society. The National Movement organised the Spanish society and the 
structure of the State according to the political ideology of the dictatorship (see Sueiro & Díaz-Nosty, 
1978). 
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that could have influenced the patterns of vote in the Second Republic was women's right to 
vote. The female vote was finally approved during the first left-wing government of the Republic. 
Nonetheless, it had not gained the full support of the left-wing parties. According to some 
academics (Durán y Laguna, 2007; Morant et al., 2006), the main reason behind this behaviour 
was the fear of the left-wing parties of the influence of the Church on women, which could 
benefit conservative parties. 
During the first left-wing governments of the Republic, the positions between right and left were 
becoming gradually polarised. In the second general elections of the Republic of 1933, the right-
wing parties led by the CEDA obtained an important victory. A new government formed by the 
CEDA and the PRR was established, thus putting a stop to the previous reformist period and 
starting a conservative period. At the same time, most of the main left-wing parties, such as the 
PSOE, were excluded from any chance of governing. It is during this time when the PSOE gives 
up a moderate position and tends to radicalise its political ideals. It has been discussed (Vera, 
1982: 179-185) that the radicalisation of the PSOE was initially owing to the rise of fascism in 
countries such as Germany and Austria during those years and that the emergence of Spanish 
fascism encouraged the PSOE to take action in order not to lose the worker bases. Similarly, 
another reason is related to the fact that the CNT was the first contender of the PSOE for leading 
Spanish unionism and that it was gaining ground to the socialist UGT. However, according to 
Vera (1982: 195), the PSOE complied with the existing legal framework when it organised worker 
strikes before it was excluded from the government. Therefore, it was the reliance on the 
reforms of the first government of the Republic that eased the revolutionary policies of the 
PSOE. Moreover, according to Vera (1982), it was the loss of the government and the rupture 
with reform policies what caused the radicalisation of the PSOE, increasing the tensions between 
right and left. 
The tensions between right-wing and left-wing political forces peaked in 1934, when a 
revolution encouraged by the left-wing parties broke out against the right-wing government. As 
has already been mentioned and as Avilés (2008: 131) discusses in his work, several reasons 
have been given to explain the socialist uprising. It has been stated that it was a strategy to 
defend itself against fascism and the rise of the conservative CEDA. Moreover, it has also been 
suggested that the real aim was to seize power for different reasons, including the unrest of the 
workers, the socialist radicalisation going back to its origins or the salvation of the Republic 
(Avilés, 2008: 131-135).  
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All over Spain there were riots and strikes. Although most of them were stifled by the 
government, in Asturias and Catalonia there were important confrontations. According to 
Kustrín (2013), in 1934 there existed two distinct revolutionary processes: the socialist riots and 
the revolution of Catalonia. The socialist revolution took different shapes depending on the 
power or political position of the socialist organisations, which were highly decentralised. As 
Kustrín (2013: 22) and Avilés (2008: 137) point out, the political position of the PSOE ranged 
from the most radical left-wing, led by the head of the PSOE and the socialist youth, to the 
centrist sectors of the PSOE on the other side. Whilst the leader of the PSOE, Largo Caballero, 
and the socialist youth upheld the social revolution, the moderate socialists adopted the strike 
as its strategy. The UGT, the CNT and the PCE formed an alliance to mobilise the workers and 
the peasantry. 
In the south of Spain, the uprising did not have a significant effect, in words of Kustrín (2013: 
24), owing to the predominance of the peasantry, which had been repressed as a result of a 
rural strike carried out a few months before. Furthermore, in Navarra and Castile, the revolution 
did not become a threat for the government either. Navarra had a strong Carlist tradition that 
stopped the mobilisation of worker and peasant bases. Likewise, in Castile, the CEDA had the 
greatest support among the population. Only in the north of Castile, where the mining industry 
was stronger, were there remarkable riots against the government (Kustrín, 2013: 24). In the 
Basque Country, the uprising took mainly the form of peaceful strikes, although there were some 
riots located in areas with steel and mining industry. In Madrid, the revolutionary efforts were 
also unfruitful, even though it was a long strike which affected the normal functioning of the 
capital (Kustrín, 2013: 26). 
On the other hand, in Asturias, unlike in the rest of Spain, the initial riots became a genuine 
revolution. The uprising lasted two weeks and it was supported by wide sectors of the miners, 
united in an alliance between the UGT and the CNT, among others. The revolution of Asturias 
snatched the control of Asturias from the Republican government. Finally, the control of Asturias 
was recovered through the military intervention of troops from Morocco.  
In Catalonia, the revolutionary process took a particular form due to the combination of the 
nationalist movement with the workers’ revolt (Kustrín, 2013: 23). As happened in 1931, the 
Catalan government led by the ERC announced the establishment of a Catalan Republic within 
a Federal Republic. According to Kustrín (2013: 24), the Catalan uprising of 1934 was not an 
attempt to achieve independence; unlike the proclamation of 1931, this new insurrection looked 
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for a total rupture with the conservative government and the establishment of a provisional 
government of the Republic in Catalonia. Nonetheless, the riots were relevant, as happened in 
Asturias, and they were readily repressed by government troops one day later. 
According to Linz (1967: 263), the relevance of the class conflict in the cities, as well as in the 
countryside and within Catalonia and the Basque Country, pushed Spain to a class-based party 
system in which, unlike other countries, the regional conflicts added further strength to the class 
and ideological cleavages. Similarly, the cleavage between clerical and anticlerical forced the 
bourgeois left to ally with the proletarian left and forced the fascists to ally with the clerical and 
conservative right against the revolutionary left (Linz, 1967: 264).  
The general elections of 1936 divided the party system in two main forces: the PSOE and the 
CEDA. The most moderate Republican forces also got relevant representation, as well as the ERC 
and the PCE, which obtained more seats compared to previous elections. The union among the 
PSOE, the Republican forces, the ERC and the PCE in the Frente Popular resulted in a left-wing 
government, whilst the opposition was formed by the CEDA, the royalists, the agrarians, the 
Lliga Catalana and minor forces such as the Carlists and the fascists. The assassination of the 
monarchist leader, Calvo Sotelo, by the end of 1936 increased the tensions between these 
alliances. 
After the unsuccessful coup attempt in July of 1936 and the beginning of the Civil War, these 
political alliances were organised on both sides of the war. The army, led by Franco, kept the 
right-wing coalition united despite its differences while, on the other side, in the Republican 
block there were also great ideological differences among anarcho-syndicalists, who rejected 
the bourgeois democracy, socialists and communists (Linz, 1967: 264). On both sides there was 
disunity, the greater part of the Republican alliance was formed by the Frente Popular and the 
anarcho-syndicalists. The PNV also reluctantly supported the Republican alliance in order to 
control its territory, although there was dissent among its governing body due to its conservative 
ideals (De Pablo, 2003). In words of Nuñez-Seixas (2007: 561), in 1936, the peripheral 
nationalism had to choose between motherland, class position and religion. In Catalonia and 
Galicia, the social landscape was similar. The right-wing nationalists of Catalonia were fearful of 
the anarchists or communist and the social revolution. In most circumstances, the nationalist 
parties, due to their territorial aspirations, would override their conservative ideals and they 
would support the Republic. 
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On the other side, the political divisions were also remarkable. According to Linz (1978), the 
dictatorship of Franco was presented authoritarian features rather than being a totalitarian 
regime. The role of Franco was to act as mediator and authoritarian leader among the diverse 
ideological trends of the insurgent forces that would later be part of the State (Sueiro & Díaz-
Nosty, 1978). Similarly to the disunity between fascists and traditionalists, these differences 
were present among monarchists and liberal conservatives, as well as among all groups. One 
year later, Franco forced the union between the Carlists and the FE de las JONS, which would 
form the FET de las JONS, the only party in the one-party state. This merge was contrived and 
compelled by Franco due to the need to control a single party, despite the ideological divisions 
that existed between the Carlist traditionalists and fascists. In words of Casanova (2007), the 
dictatorship of Franco based its ideological foundations on conservative Catholicism and 
fascism, which would give rise to Franquismo. 
CHAPTER 2. Socio-economic factors and voting patterns during the Second Republic 
 
2.1 Class cleavage in Spain 
As it has been pointed out previously, the Spanish class cleavage began to crystallise into a 
political movement towards the middle of the 20th century. The anarcho-syndicalism, led by the 
CNT and the FAI and, later on, the socialism led by the UGT and other branches related to the 
PSOE, would be the main structures of trade union mobilisation nationally. Nonetheless, the 
development of Spanish trade unionism was strongly linked to the Spanish social and economic 
structure. 
The origins of Spanish trade unionism lie in the industrial areas of Spain and specifically in 
Catalonia, where industry was stronger. From Catalonia, Spanish unionism spreaded to other 
industrialised regions, such as the Basque Country, and to port regions such as Asturias and 
Galicia. However, the economic structure of Spain as a whole was not based only on the 
industrial sector. Regions in southern and central Spain, such as Andalusia or Castile, or in 
eastern Spain, such as Valencia, based their economic activity on the agricultural and fishing 
sectors. Consequently, in the Spanish economic activity, despite some northern industrialized 
regions, the agriculture and fishing sectors were a relevant social group for political and social 
aims. 
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Figure 1. Prepared by author based on data from “Población, salud y actividad” in Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 150). 
The figure represents some of the main sectors of economic activity nationally. 
In the beginning of the 20th century, the agricultural and fishing sector represented 66.3% of 
the economic activity of Spain. The relevance of this sector was decreasing steadily during the 
following years until the beginning of the Civil War, when it increased slightly. However, at the 
beginning of the Civil War in 1936 and at its end in 1939, it still represented between 45.5 and a 
50.5% of the Spanish economy. It was not until the 1950s and onwards when agriculture and 
fishing would be rapidly replaced by the growth of other economic sectors, that caused this 
sector to decline and represent less than 10% of the economic activity in the 1990s. 
As can be seen in figure 1, the economic activity linked to industrial sectors, such as 
manufacturing, represented only 19.2% at the start of the 1930s. A few years after the Civil War, 
the manufacturing sector had decreased to 15.6% and, after four decades, it stabilised around 
20% and 25%. Furthermore, according to data from Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 149), in 1910 the 
total number of people working in agriculture and fishing amounted to approximately 5 million, 
and 739,200 people were working in industrial manufacturing. In 1920 and 1930, 4.6 and 4 
million people worked in agriculture and fishing whilst 1.1 and 1.6 million people worked in 
industrial manufacture. Similarly, in 1940, the amount of people working in agriculture and 
fishing was 4.7 million and 1.3 in the industrial sector. Likewise, the urban population grew from 
37.1% in 1930 to 50.7% in 1960 and 70.8% in 2001 (Carreras & Tafunell, 2005: 486).  
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The agrarian sector was the main economic driving force of labour activity in Spain until the 
1970s, when the manufacture and new technology sectors began to overtake the relevance of 
agriculture. The percentages of economic activity and the amount of labour force involved in 
each economic sector shows the relevance of agriculture and fishing well into the 20th century 
compared to industrial activities. Consequently, supremacy of agricultural activities correlates 
with the population distribution of that era. The rural world, where approximately half of the 
population lived until 1960s, was also an important area that influenced the political 
configuration of Spain.  
Although the agrarian world was prominent, it was not politically homogeneous. As it has been 
already stated, almost all the political currents were present in the peasantry and rural world. 
The rupture with the old "cacique system" (see note 3), as a result of the dictatorship of Primo 
de Rivera during the 1920s, implied that most of the farmers and rural workers began to self-
organise and to join new political forces that were growing rapidly. Unions, such as the CNT and 
the UGT, started to expand from traditional industrial areas and focused on forming a worker 
base in the rural world. On the other side, as has been previously described, small and medium 
landowners of the agrarian world, mostly conservative and heirs of the old system, started to 
organise in agrarian, conservative and royalist parties, helped by the influence of the Church. 
In the early 1930s, trade union presence in the rural world, as well as in industrial areas, was 
sizable and kept growing over the course of the decade. 
 
Figure 2. Prepared by author based on data from “Elecciones y Política” in Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 1074-1154). * 
CNT members of the Basque Country are combined with CNT members of Cantabria.  
 38 
Figure 2 illustrates the number of CNT members in 1931 and 1936 by main regions. There, the 
decrease in the number of members in Catalonia between 1931 and 1936 can be seen. The main 
cause may be the split of the CNT into the FAI and other anarcho-syndicalist organizations 
among revolutionary or moderate positions. Moreover, the number of CNT members in the rest 
of the regions grew steadily. In the Basque Country, Galicia and Andalusia, the number of 
members doubled in the majority of cases. Conversely, in Asturias, the number of members of 
the CNT remained nearly constant over five years, due presumably to the strong presence of 
other trade unionist forces such as the UGT. 
As it can be observed, Catalonia and Andalusia stand out for the number of members compared 
to other regions such as the Basque Country or Galicia. Nonetheless, this difference could be 
related to the population of each region or, by contrast, could be due to particular reasons. The 
following table shows the percentage of CNT members in 1931 by total population in 1930: 
 Catalonia Basque Country Asturias Galicia Andalusia Madrid 
Total Population in 1930 2721000 892000 364000 2230000 4610000 2477000 
Total CNT members in 1931 299753 3760 24881 13218 113157 5474 
CNT members by population 11.01% 0.42% 6.83% 0.59% 2.45% 0.22% 
Table 1. CNT members by population and region in 1930 and 1931. Prepared by author based on data from Carreras 
& Tafunell (2005: 1074-1154) for number of CNT members in 1931 and Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 486) for total 
population in 1930. 
As can be seen in table 1, in Catalonia, approximately 11.01% of the population belonged to the 
CNT during 1930 and 1931. This result shows the strong link of Catalonia to the CNT during the 
first years of the Second Republic. Both the predominance of industry in Catalonia and the great 
worker base are likely the main causes of the relevant presence of the CNT. Likewise, historically, 
Catalonia was the first source of syndicalism and from there it spreaded to the rest of Spain. 
Other trade unions, such as the UGT, also achieved an important presence in Catalonia. 
Therefore, the results present Catalonia as one of the regions with more capacity for worker 
mobilisation and with a major anarcho-syndicalist presence. Similarly, historical facts as the 
support of Catalonia to the Frente Popular during the Civil War verify it. 
Secondly, the population from Asturias was also a noticeable supporter of the CNT. Around 
6.83% of the population was member of the CNT between 1930 and 1931. Similarly to Catalonia, 
historical facts, such as the Revolution of 1934, reveal the presence of a remarkable trade 
unionism, either of the socialist UGT or anarcho-syndicalism. By contrast, unlike Catalonia, 
Asturias did not have a strong industry and most of the worker base came from mining and rural 
sectors (see Carreras & Tafunell, 2005: 357). Moreover, also unlike Catalonia and the rest of the 
regions shown in table 1, the number of CNT members was almost steady from 1931 to 1936. 
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This may be due either to a stronger establishment of the CNT among the population of Asturias 
before other regions or to the growth of other trade unions such as the UGT. 
Andalusia, like Asturias, was not as industrialised as Catalonia and farming, together with other 
related activities, was the predominant economic sector. Roughly 2.45% of the population of 
Andalusia belonged to the CNT at the beginning of the 1930s. Nonetheless, the number of CNT 
members increased from 113157 to 184013 between 1931 and 1936 (Carreras & Tafunell, 2005: 
486). 
In Madrid and Galicia, almost 0.22% and 0.59% of the population belonged to the CNT 
respectively. The industry was more relevant in Madrid compared to Galicia, wherein agriculture 
was the main economic sector but the industrial GVA of Madrid was not comparable to that of 
Catalonia in that time (see Carreras et al, 2005: 405). As can be observed in figure 2, the growth 
in CNT members was substantial in both cases. Between 1931 and 1936, the number of CNT 
members grew from 5474 to 32162 in Madrid and from 13218 to 33209 in Galicia. 
Finally, another case worth mentioning is the case of the Basque Country where, despite the 
historical industrialisation of the region, approximately only 0.42% of the population belonged 
to the CNT between 1930 and 1931. Even though the number of CNT members almost doubled 
from 3760 in 1931 to 7683 in 1936, the power of the CNT was irrelevant in the Basque Country. 
As it has already been pointed out in the historical overview, the establishment of the Basque 
trade union, called ELA-STV and linked to the PNV, attracted a great amount of workers. 
Likewise, the UGT also attracted a sizeable worker base to socialism from non-Basque groups. 
Moreover, the presence of Carlism in the rural world of part of the Basque Country and Navarra 
could have stopped the spreading of anarcho-syndicalism in the rural community. 
Both the growth in CNT members and the percentage of CNT members by total population 
present significant differences among regions. It can be clearly observed how the early 
industrialisation influenced the presence of anarcho-syndicalism in Catalonia and the 
subsequently expansion over the rest of the regions. Likewise, agriculture and mining were other 
sectors in which the CNT gained relevance, as the cases of Andalusia and Asturias illustrate. 
Nevertheless, economic factors are not the only explanation for the membership of the CNT. As 
the cases of the Basque Country or Galicia indicate, peripheral nationalisms and conservative 
positions of the population opposed to anarcho-syndicalism could have played an important role 
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for the growth of the CNT in these regions. Similarly, the UGT may also have influenced the 
power of the CNT in several regions by attracting workers and farmers to socialism. 
As it has been mentioned before, the UGT was the other leading trade union and principal 
competitor of the CNT, the anarchosyndicalist forces and the peripheral trade unions. Since its 
foundation in 1888, it was gaining relevance among the Spanish worker bases to become an 
important political lobby, as it was demonstrated in the Revolution of 1934 through the mass 
mobilisation of workers nationally. The UGT was politically linked to the PSOE because of their 
ideological roots and common founder, Pablo Iglesias. Since its formation and until the end of 
Franco´s dictatorship, the UGT can be considered the trade union branch of the PSOE, united 
under the same political leadership. 
Similarly to the CNT, the UGT was growing rapidly from the industrial areas of Catalonia to the 
rest of Spain. According to data of membership in the UGT and the PSOE (Carreras et al, 2005: 
1138), in 1904, the total amount of members was 55,817, whilst the number of members of the 
PSOE was 10,500. During the following years until the beginning of the Second Republic, the 
membership growth of the UGT and the PSOE was erratic. In 1918, the PSOE had 11,241 
members and the UGT around 100,000. However, in 1924, the number of members decreased 
to 8,215 for the PSOE whilst the members of the UGT increased to 210,617. At the end of the 
dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and the beginning of the Second Republic, between 1930 and 
1931, the number of members of the UGT increased sharply to 958,451 and exceeded one 
million in 1932. The growth of members in the PSOE was not as pronounced as in the UGT, but 
the party also reached approximately 20,000 members in 1931. 
Firstly, the aforementioned data illustrate the power of the UGT in the Second Republic, with 
more than one million members nationally. The UGT, together with the CNT, which had 612,705 
members in 1936 (Carreras & Tafunell, 2005: 1139), were organizations with huge social bases 
to achieve their aims. It should be noted that, in addition to the CNT and the UGT, there also 
existed other trade union organizations, such as the FAI, or specialized branches of the main 
trade unions, such as the National Federation of Land Workers (FNTT; Federación Nacional de 
Trabajadores de la Tierra), which was part of the UGT. The presence of other trade union 
organizations and branches increases enormously the number of members linked in some way 
to unionism. 
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Another relevant event was the change of government form from the dictatorship of Primo de 
Rivera to the Second Republic which influenced the membership growth of the UGT as the data 
show. Even though it has mentioned in the historical overview that the PSOE, including the UGT, 
had had been in dialogue with the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, they were not repressed as 
happened to the CNT. The beginning of the new democratic era, apparently, encouraged people 
to become members of the UGT. 
Also, it is important to point out the remarkable difference of formal members between the 
PSOE and the UGT. Although it has been mentioned that the PSOE and the UGT shared the 
membership and political leadership over this period, it can be seen that the UGT had a vast 
amount of members compared to the PSOE. This result shows that the social base of the PSOE 
was mainly supported on trade unionism and workers rather than on other social groups. 
Turning again to the agrarian issue, the UGT organized its activities in the rural world by the 
foundation in 1930 of the FNTT. As happened with the UGT, the FNTT grew quickly during the 
course of the Second Republic by attracting farmers and peasants to its ranks. 
The FNTT, of a solely rural and agrarian nature, was able to achieve a notable success among 
rural groups. All regions were dominantly agrarian-based. Among the four regions analysed from 
Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 1139), Andalusia and Valencia are the regions where the FNTT had 
less success. In 1932, 15% of all active farmers in Andalusia and 13.5% in Valencia were members 
of the FNTT. Furthermore, in Extremadura the percentage of farmers belonging to the FNTT was 
24% and 23.5% in Castile the New and Albacete. 
As can be seen, the membership of the FNTT in regions with a marked predominance of agrarian 
activities was high. Like in the most industrialized northern regions, socialist trade unionism also 
achieved a powerful social base in the agrarian areas of the south of Spain. Socialist unionism in 
the rural world also played an important role as political force in the foundation of the Second 
Republic. In the Revolution of 1934, the riots and strikes carried out by the peasantry in those 
areas under the influence of the PSOE were able to put considerable political pressure on the 
conservative government of the Republic. 
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According to the membership data of the different trade unions, the majority of the regions of 
Spain had a powerful syndical presence regardless of their economic structure and location, 
although it is true that the political ideology of unionism in the different regions was influenced 
sometimes by the particular features of that region. By way of example, in the Basque Country 
the presence of anarcho-syndicalism was almost irrelevant compared to other areas, such as 
Catalonia, where anarcho-syndicalism dominated the syndical arena. It has been mentioned that 
the existence of other particular trade unions or the origins of workers could have affected the 
prevalence of one trade union or another. 
However, national trade unionism was fairly cohesive during the course of the Second Republic 
and the Civil War. The Revolution of 1934 was formed by anarchosyndicalists, socialists and 
communists, although the political effort was led by the PSOE and the UGT. Likewise, before the 
beginning of the Second Republic, the strikes increased as the trade unions grew. 
 
Figure 3. Number of strikes: timeline 1905-1936. Prepared by author based on data from Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 
1242). 
Figure 3 illustrates how the number of strikes started to increase from 1911 on and how its 
development is erratic until 1917, when it increases sharply from 306 to 895 strikes in just two 
years. Certainly, the graphs regarding the number of strikes before 1920 show the instability and 
the increase of worker mobilisation during this time. Moreover, the intense decrease of the 
number of strikes due to the establishment of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera is also 
remarkable. From 1921 until 1929, the number of strikes decreased from 373 to 96. From 1929, 
with the advent of the Second Republic, the number rose to 402 strikes in 1931 and it increased 
even more in 1933, when there were 1,127 strikes. In 1933, as a result of the change of 
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government, the number of strikes falls again from 1,127 to 181 in 1935, but in 1936 rises to 887 
strikes as had occurred previously. 
It can be observed how the number of strikes decreases drastically in two periods. During the 
dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, from 1923 to 1930, and during the change of republican 
government in 1933. The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera significantly affected the labour 
movement by repressing it or, as it has been pointed out previously, as a result of the 
negotiations carried out with the labour forces of the PSOE. Furthermore, by the end of the 
dictatorship, the number of strikes increased considerably, continuing during the first years of 
the Second Republic. In 1933, when the change of government takes place, resulting in a 
conservative government between the PRR and the CEDA, the number of strikes decreased 
again to the levels of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera despite the Revolution of 1934. 
Nonetheless, after the Revolution of 1934 and despite the failure, the trade unions and the 
related political forces, as the PSOE or the PCE, continued encouraging the labour movement, 
as the strong growth in strikes until 1936 shows. 
It is noticeable that the labour movement begun to grow considerably before the beginning of 
the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Certainly, it rose to high levels in 1919 and was decreasing 
until the end of the dictatorship. Similarly, it decreases in 1933 until 1935, when it increased 
sharply again. The data show how the labour movement was fairly active from 1919 and how 
the political context influenced the performance of the labour movement. 
Broadly speaking, the results are clear indicators of the relevance of the labour movement 
before the Civil War of 1936 and the class cleavage. The trade union membership was relatively 
active both in industrial regions as in rural areas. Moreover, this support created a powerful 
social base linked to political organizations and parties for political mobilization, as occurred in 
the Revolution of 1934. However, the salience of the class cleavage in Spain during this period 
cannot be considered the main factor responsible for subsequent events. As Linz (1967: 263) 
indicated, the class cleavage in Spain was combined often with other cleavages, such as the 
nationalist or the religious cleavage. Several parties joined political forces on the social cleavage 
that they considered more relevant for their interests, as happened with the PNV by joining the 
Frente Popular against the centralism of the military uprising, or with the Lliga, which supported 
non-Catalan conservative parties against the ERC.   
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2.2 Party System and Vote by Region in 1931 
After the fall of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, the Spanish party system emerged as a multi-
party system. The two-party system which had ruled Spain during the Restoration until the 
beginning of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera had been weakened due to causes previously 
mentioned. Nonetheless, the new party system changed considerably over the course of the 
Second Republic. As Linz (1967: 259) states, over time, the initial multi-party system resulted in 
a polarized conflict in which several political parties and organizations formed the two sides that 
caused the Civil War. 
The first configuration of the party system in 1931 was dominated by republican and left-wing 
parties. The following pie chart shows the main political parties in the general elections of 1931. 
 
Figure 4. Vote share (%) in the general elections of 1931 (first round). Prepared by author based on data from Carreras 
& Tafunell (2005: 1099-1100). 
Figure 4 shows the vote share of the main political parties in the general elections of 1931. 
Firstly, the vote share that the PSOE achieved, with a 21.4% of the total share, is remarkable. 
This result illustrates the increasing power that the PSOE had reached since the beginning of the 
century and that it is reflected in the results of the general elections of 1931. The second political 
force was the PRR with a 13.2% of the vote share. As it has already been mentioned, the PRR 
was essential for the government coalitions that would form in 1931 and 1933 with the socialists 
and the CEDA respectively. Likewise, the PRR would change its ideology from a centre-left and 
republican ideology to more conservative ideals in 1933. 
Furthermore, the DLR and the PRRS were also republican political parties with 8.9% and 11.8% 
of the vote share respectively. The DLR was conservative and liberal while the PRRS was a radical, 
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liberal and left-wing party. Despite of the DLR, the most conservative parties, such as the 
agrarians, obtained a 3% of the vote share and the right-wing independents reached 1.4% of the 
vote share. In Catalonia, the ERC obtained 6.7% of the vote share and the Lliga 1.8% of the votes. 
In the Basque Country and Navarre, the PNV had 1.5% of the vote share and the Carlists and 
traditionalists obtained approximately 1% of the votes. The PCE received 0.8% of the votes. 
From a general point of view, the Spanish party system in the first general elections of 1931 was 
a multi-party system with republican dominance. The economic and social left-wing political 
parties surpassed other conservative political parties. Left-wing political parties, such as the 
PSOE and the PRRS, had a considerable amount of the vote share even though the PRR and the 
DLR were also important political parties of conservative tendencies. The regional political 
parties also obtained a proportional vote share. The share of ERC compared to the Lliga that, as 
it has been stated, was adversely affected by their support of the monarchy, is remarkable. 
Moreover, the PNV and the Carlists were marginal political forces with a low share in parliament. 
Similarly, the agrarian party or the right-wing independents were marginal political forces. 
It is important to note that the overview of the party system in a general election may not 
represent possible territorial differences in vote patterns. This is important for the purpose of 
this research since the territorial configuration of Spain has been pointed out as relevant in social 
and economic differences. 
 Andalusia Madrid Basque 
Country 
Navarre Castile e Catalonia Extremadura National 
Total 
PRR        15.7 - - - 11.3 9.4 - 13.2 
DLR 11.1 - - - 18.6 - - 8.9 
PRRS - 9 13.8 - 12 7.2 10.8 11.8 
PRCon - 6 - - - - 7.7 8.9 
Republica - - - 21.7 - - - 0.5 
IR 0.7 - - - - - - 0.2 
PSOE 36.8 38 14.7 7.2 13.5 1 44.7 21.4 
PCE 1.8 0.7 2.6 - - - - 0.8 
Right b - - - 12.8 - - - 0.5 
Agrarians 0.2 - - - 4.3 - - 1.8 
AN - 6.1 - - 7.7 - - 1.9 
PNV - - 29.8 12.7 - - - 1.5 
ANV - - 5.4 - - - - 0.2 
Carlist c - - 19.3 39.5 - - - 1.7 
ERC - - - - - 53 - 6.7 
Lliga - - - - - 14 - 1.8 
Table 2. Vote share (%) by region and total nationally in the general elections of 1931 (first round).a Republican are 
minor republican political parties. b Right indep. are independent right-wing candidacies. c Carlists are combined with 
traditionalists and Catholics supporters of fueros. e Castile corresponds to the current Castile and León. Prepared by 
author based on available data from Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 1101) and Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 1099-1100) for 
national votes of the PRR and the DLR. 
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Table 2 shows the available data of vote share by region and nationwide total in the first round 
of the general elections of 1931. There are some differences between the total of vote share 
nationally and the amount of votes obtained by particular political parties in some regions. 
The PSOE was one of the political parties which obtained more votes nationally. However, the 
vote share nationally had a high deviation among regions. In Extremadura, the vote share of the 
PSOE was 44.7%, while in Catalonia it was only 1%. Similarly, the vote share was 38% in Madrid 
and 7.2% in Navarre. Likewise, the PSOE obtained 36.8% of the vote share in Andalusia and 
13.4% in Castile. 
It can be observed that in agrarian regions, such as Andalusia and Extremadura, where the 
unionism linked to the PSOE had reached a large number of farmers, the support to the PSOE 
was considerable. Nonetheless, Castile was also an agrarian region where the PSOE did not 
achieve a similar success to Andalusia and Extremadura. Likewise, Navarre had the same 
features but the vote share was 7.2%. In such regions, other political forces attracted those 
votes. In Navarre, it is clear that Carlism got the rural votes from peasantry and obtained 39.5% 
of the votes. The votes in Castile went to republican and conservative parties, as the vote share 
of the PRR and the DLR illustrates.  
In Catalonia, the PSOE hardly obtained 1% of the votes even though it was where Spanish 
unionism originated and it was also an industrialized area. Two reasons could be given as main 
explanation. Firstly, the strong presence of anarcho-syndicalism decreased the importance of 
socialist unionism and, consequently, the votes for the PSOE. Secondly, the ERC attracted the 
socialist as well as the nationalist vote. Likely, both reasons are valid to explain the lack of 
support to the PSOE in Catalonia. The republican and left-wing ideals of the ERC contributed to 
the party’s success in the elections. The ERC obtained 53% of the votes and the Lliga only 14%. 
Other national parties had similar results in Catalonia. The PRR got 9.4% and the PRRS 7.2% of 
the vote share. 
Like Catalonia, the Basque Country is a particular case. The nationalist and regionalist parties, 
such as the PNV and the Carlists, obtained 29.8% and 19.3% of the vote share respectively. 
Likewise, the left-wing nationalists, led by the ANV, got 5.4% of the votes. On the other hand, 
the national political parties attracted a large part of the rest of the votes. The PSOE got 14.7% 
of the vote share and the PRRS 13.8%. As in Catalonia, the nationalist and regionalist vote was 
almost half of the electorate but, unlike in Catalonia, within this electorate the vote was mostly 
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conservative. The PSOE achieved better results than in Catalonia but it did not reach the 
percentage of Andalusia or Extremadura. The PRRS also achieved a remarkable vote share, 
above its national results. 
In Navarre, the Carlists obtained 39.5% and the PNV 12.7% of the votes. Other right-wing 
candidacies got 12.8% of the vote share. Republican forces of Navarre got 21.7% of the votes 
and, as it has been mentioned before, the PSOE obtained 7.2% of the votes in Navarre. Like in 
the Basque Country, the nationalist and regionalist vote was mainly conservative, while the 
republican and socialist forces attracted the remaining votes. 
In the inner regions of Spain the vote was more similar, although the power of the political forces 
varied among regions. In Madrid, the PSOE obtained good results, unlike the rest of political 
parties in which the low number of votes was equally distributed. However, in Castile the 
socialist vote was as fragmented as for republican and conservative parties such as the PRR and 
the DLR. The PSOE got 13.5% of the vote share, while the PRR and the DLR obtained 11.3% and 
18.6% respectively. 
The overview of vote patterns in 1931 shows that the vote varied regionally. It is true that the 
largest part of the vote was republican and the formal royalist parties were almost non-existent. 
The vote based on other social cleavages played a relevant role. In inner regions, among the 
republican parties, the conservative and centrist parties, such as the PRR and the DLR, received 
remarkable support from the electorate, as the case of Andalusia or Castile illustrates. Socialism, 
especially in agrarian regions except in Castile, was the biggest political force opposed to them, 
as occurred in Andalusia and Extremadura. 
In Madrid, the PSOE was also the strongest political force, while the rest of the votes were for 
political forces of large ideological spectrum. However, in Barcelona, another large city, the 
support to the PSOE was marginal. The nationalist and regionalist parties obtained the majority 
of the votes, although the ERC greatly surpassed the votes of the Lliga. In the Catalan case, the 
nationalist and left-wing votes were the main voter tendencies. By contrast, in the Basque 
Country and Navarre the voter tendencies were also nationalist and regionalist, but the votes 
were mostly conservative (for the PNV and the Carlists), as the limited success of the ANV 
demonstrates. 
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2.3 Party System and Vote by Region in 1933 
In the next general elections of 1933, the political scene was slightly different. The emergence 
of the CEDA was the first mass political force opposed to the left-wing parties and some 
republican parties. The catholic and conservative ideals contrary to the policies carried out by 
the republican parties and the progressive Constitution of 1931 were the ideological baseline of 
its political goals. It is highly important to note that these elections were the first in which 
women were allowed to vote and, as it has been discussed in the historical review, it was a 
controversial point because of the potential influence of Church in female voters. 
According to data of Carreras (2005: 1099), the PSOE was the political party with the largest vote 
share. 19.4% of the votes were for the PSOE. In second place was the PRR with 14.3% of the 
votes and the last large political force was the CEDA, with 13.9% of the vote share. Generally, 
the conservative and right-wing forces obtained a slightly higher number of votes in these 
elections. The Agrarians obtained 6.9% of the votes compared to a vote share of 3% in the 
previous elections. The Carlists got 4.3% in these elections and only 1% in 1931. The independent 
candidacies of right-wing ideals doubled their vote share from 1.4% to 2.8%. The Lliga recovered 
lost ground in Catalonia and obtained 3.8% of the votes, surpassing the 3.7% of the ERC. 
Likewise, the PNV increased their number of votes and reached 2.2% of the vote share. As it has 
been already said, the PRR and the CEDA formed coalition governments with support of the 
Agrarians in parliament; these governments were characterized by the political unrest and the 
Revolution of 1934.  
Furthermore, as the data of the general elections indicate, the vote patterns by region also 
changed. The following table shows the vote distribution in the first round of the general 
elections of 1933: 
 Andalusia Madrid Basque 
Country 
Navarre Castile a Catalonia Extremadura National 
Total 
PRR 20 7.6 - 3.6 8.2 5.9 30.8 14.3 
PRRS - - 0.2 - 1.5 - 0.4 1.4 
PRCon - - - - - - 5.5 3.9 
CEDA 12.9 9.1 - 10.2 26 - 18.8 13.9 
RE - 5.4 7.4 - - - - 2.8 
PSOE 31.2 37 13.4 13.8 15.7 1.3 42.7 19.4 
PCE 5.1 3.2 3.1 0.9 0.8 - 0.7 1.9 
Right b - - - 28.6 - - - 2.8 
Agrarians 7.3 5.2 - - 22.8 - - 6.9 
PNV - - 44.6 9.4 - - - 2.2 
Tradition. c 1.8 3.5 17.2 42.9 3.4 4.8 - 4.3 
ERC - - - - - 31 - 3.7 
Lliga - - - - - 32.9 - 3.8 
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Table 3. Vote share (%) by region and total nationally in the general elections of 1933 (first round). a Castile 
corresponds to the current Castile and León. b Right indep. are independent right-wing candidacies. c Traditionalists 
represent Catholics and supporters of fueros under Carlism. Prepared by author based on available data from Carreras 
& Tafunell (2005: 1105). 
In the general elections of 1933, the PSOE lost votes in almost all the regions displayed, except 
in Navarre and Castile, where their votes increased considerably. By contrast, the CEDA obtained 
a remarkable amount of votes in all regions. Without doubt, at this time, the beginning of the 
ideological polarization can be observed. The republican parties which had obtained a large 
number of seats in the elections of 1931, such as the PRRS and the DLR, disappeared or lost an 
important number of votes in these elections. The PRR was the only Republican Party with 
political power in parliament. 
Nonetheless, the differences from region to region were still important in these elections. The 
number of votes for the PRR in Andalusia, for example, increased compared to the elections of 
1931 and the party also obtained a remarkable vote share in Extremadura. By contrast, the PRR 
lost large amounts of votes in the remaining regions. On the other hand, the CEDA erupted in 
almost all regions and became the third political force in Andalusia and Extremadura, as 
happened nationally. In Castile, the CEDA was the main political force with 26% of the vote 
share, rivalling the agrarians, with 22.8% of votes, and the PSOE, with 15.7%. Similarly, in 
Navarre the party obtained 10.2% of the votes. 
As can be seen in southern regions, in interior regions such as Castile, and in Navarre, the 
republican parties that obtained an important number of votes before, lost them in these 
elections. The other noticeable event was the rise of the CEDA in the aforementioned regions, 
which rapidly became the third political force or, in places such as Castile, first political force.  
As national results indicate, the votes for the PNV increased in the Basque Country but 
decreased in Navarre. The failure of the conjoint autonomy process of the Basque Country and 
Navarre and, furthermore, the political discrepancies between the PNV and the parties in 
Navarre, could be key reasons. Likewise, it can be seen that the amount of votes for the 
traditionalists increased as the votes for PNV decreased from 12.7% to 9.4%, while traditionalists 
obtained 42.9% in 1933 and 39.5% in 1931. Moreover, in Navarre, the rest of the votes were 
mainly distributed among conservative forces, such as right-wing candidacies, and the CEDA. 
The number of votes of the PSOE, by contrast, increased in Navarre, although it cannot be 
compared to the number of votes of right-wing parties altogether. 
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In the Basque Country, the PNV was the major party with 44.6% of the vote share. Contrary to 
the case in Navarre, the increase in the votes for the PNV amounted to more than the votes lost 
by traditionalists. While the PNV got 44.6% in these elections and 29.8% in 1931, the 
traditionalists in the Basque Country obtained 17.2%, 2.1% less than in 1931. 
In Catalonia, the political arena was divided between the ERC and the Lliga with a 31% and 32.9% 
of the vote share respectively. As occurred in previous elections, the support of the PSOE, with 
a 1.3% of votes, was irrelevant compared to other regions. In Madrid, the political landscape 
remained quite similar as well. The PSOE was the main political force. The CEDA obtained 9.1% 
of the vote share, significantly less than in close regions such as Castile or Extremadura. Besides 
the CEDA, other political parties also appeared. The emergence of the royalist Renovación 
Española (RE; Spanish Renovation), that obtained some support in the Basque Country or 
Madrid and got 2.8% of the votes nationally, is remarkable. The PCE improved its results by 
getting 1.9% of the votes nationally and obtained better results in Andalusia, the Basque Country 
and Madrid than in Castile and Navarre. 
As can be seen in Table 3, voter tendencies also varied by region as occurred in 1931. Even so, 
despite the differences among regions, the voter tendencies within regions also changed, 
something that was reflected in the national results. The two main forces that would play an 
important role in the future, the CEDA and the PSOE, were tied in number of votes. Moreover, 
the republican parties, that obtained an important number of votes in the general elections of 
1931, had been weakened, thus benefiting the CEDA and the PSOE. After the beginning the 
Second Republic, the ideological polarization began to be reflected in the party system. Even in 
nationalist regions such as Catalonia, this ideological polarization in nationalist and regionalist 
parties can be observed. 
2.4 Party System and Vote by Region in 1936 
In 1936, the increasing political tension eventually resulted in the formation of two electoral 
coalitions: the Frente Popular and a fragmented right-wing coalition called Frente Nacional 
Contra Revolucionario, led by the CEDA. Next, there is a description of the components of both 
coalitions in order to bring light to the ideological composition of each electoral block. 
The Frente Popular was composed by the PSOE, the PCE and the IR (formed in 1934 by some 
republican parties such as the AR), among others, at national level. In some regions, nationalist 
and regionalist parties supported this electoral coalition. In Catalonia, the ERC supported the 
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coalition and, in Galicia, the Organización Republicana Galega Autónoma (ORGA; Autonomous 
Galician Republican Organization) integrated into the IR.   
The Frente Nacional ContraRevolucionario was formed by the CEDA, the traditionalists, the RE 
and the agrarians, amongst other regional right-wing parties. In Catalonia, the Liga supported 
this electoral coalition together with some of the aforementioned political parties. The PRR 
joined the coalition's electoral list occasionally. By contrast, the FE run for these elections alone. 
However, as it has been indicated, this coalition was highly fragmented and the joint candidacies 
were unsuccessful in several constituencies. The following figure displays the vote share for each 
party: 
 
Figure 5. Vote share (%) in the general elections of 1936 (first round). Prepared by author based on data from Carreras 
& Tafunell (2005: 1099-1108). 
 
Starting with the main parties of the Frente Popular, the PSOE obtained 16.4% of the vote share. 
The new IR got 13.7% of the votes and the PCE 2.5%. The ERC can be considered a formal 
component of the electoral coalition with 4.1% of the votes. Putting together all votes obtained 
by the aforementioned parties, the Frente Popular obtained approximately 36.7% of the votes. 
On the other hand, the results for each formal member of the failed Frente Nacional 
Contrarevolucionario were a little worse. The CEDA got 23.2% of the votes, the Carlists 
(traditionalist) 3.4%, the RE obtained 3.8% of the votes and the agrarians 2.6% of the vote share. 
Altogether, they obtained 33% of the votes. However, the remaining political forces with relative 
strength (such as the Lliga with 2.7% of the votes, the right-wing candidacies with 3.1% of the 
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vote share too, or some conservative republican parties) were closer, in certain cases, to the 
counter-revolutionary coalition than to the Frente Popular. 
Moreover, there were political parties which did not join any electoral coalition formally, but 
they supported to a greater or lesser extent both electoral coalitions. The PNV competed 
electorally with both national coalitions in the Basque Country and resulted winner. 
Nonetheless, despite its conservative ideals, it decided to support the Frente Popular after the 
elections and during the Civil War, aiming to maintain the autonomy achieved thanks to the 
support of the republican forces. There also existed a centrist party established to control the 
polarization between both ideological blocs. It obtained only 5.1% of the votes in the first round 
of the general elections. The FE did not form any electoral coalition with the right-wing forces; 
consequently, it did not obtain any seats in parliament, getting only 0.1% of the vote nationwide. 
Similarly to national results, the vote by region was also ideologically polarized. 
 Andalusia Madrid Basque 
Country 
Navarre Castile a Catalonia Extremadura National 
Total 
PRR 2.5 4.9 - - 4.2 4.1 7.9 3.6 
IR 11.9 17.5 13.4 - 12.8 4.3 15.2 13.7 
PRCon 0.7 - - - 3 - 3.1 0.8 
UR 11.3 5.8 - - 6.5 - 8.8 5.9 
CEDA 21.4 22.9 7 22 33.3 9.1 21.6 23.2 
RE 1.8 9.7 5.7 - 0.7 - - 3.8 
PSOE 24.7 29.1 12.8 4.6 14.3 1.6 27.3 16.4 
PCE 5.4 2.9 7 4.4 - 1.4 - 2.5 
Right b 3.3 4.9 - 10.3 1.3 - - 3.1 
Agrarians 3 1.1 - - 10.9 - 2.7 2.6 
PNV - - 32.9 2 - -   - 1.4 
Tradition. c 3.2 2.5 14.9 42.9 2.8 4.1 - 3.4 
ERC - - - - - 33.2 - 4.1 
Lliga - - - - - 21.6 - 2.7 
Table 4. Vote share (%) by region and total nationally in the general elections of 1936 (first round). a Castile 
corresponds to the current Castile and León. b Right indep. are independent right-wing candidacies. c Traditionalists 
represent Catholics and supporters of fueros under Carlism. Prepared by author based on available data from Carreras 
& Tafunell (2005: 1108). 
In Table 4, it can be seen how in Andalusia, Madrid and Extremadura the vote share between 
the CEDA and the PSOE was almost the same, both between 20 and 30 percent. The IR achieved 
the third position in the aforementioned regions. As has already occurred, Navarre, the Basque 
Country, Catalonia and Castile had different vote patterns compared to the rest of the regions 
analysed.  
In Navarre, the traditionalists, the CEDA and the right-wing candidacies obtained the majority of 
the votes, circa 75.2% of the total votes. By contrast, the PSOE obtained just 4.6% of the votes, 
considerably less than in 1933 (see Table 3). The CEDA grew significantly until reaching 22% of 
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the votes. In the Basque Country, the PNV and the traditionalists also obtained a worse result 
than in previous elections. Likewise, the PSOE also obtained slightly fewer votes than in 1933. 
On the other hand, the IR obtained 13.4% of the votes. In Catalonia, the two main political rivals 
were still the ERC and the Lliga. The ERC got 33.2% of the votes, while the Lliga obtained 21.6%. 
Finally, in Castile, the CEDA and the agrarians got 33.3% and 10.9% of the votes respectively. The 
remaining ballots went to the PSOE, with 14.3% of the votes, and to the IR, with 12.8% of the 
vote share. The CEDA, together with the agrarians, got 44.2%of the votes in Castile, while the 
PSOE and the IR obtained 25.2%. Moreover, conservative agrarianism was dominant in Castile 
compared to the rest of the regions. The low number of votes obtained by the PSOE is explained, 
to a great extent, by the lack of an ideologically close peasantry base, as the party had in 
Andalusia or Extremadura. 
2.5 Discussion 
In point 2 of the present work the development of vote patterns during the course of the Second 
Republic of Spain has been discussed, highlighting, among others, the regional differences 
regarding economic structure, trade unions and other social features. 
As can be seen, the regional differences regarding economic, cultural and social issues are quite 
remarkable. The first difference is found in the economic structure of the country. Even though 
the agricultural and rural activities were dominant until the 1970s, the gap between 
industrialised and purely rural regions was large. Catalonia and the Basque Country were largely 
more industrialized than Andalusia, Extremadura or Castile (see GVA index by area from Carreras 
& Tafunell, 2005: 405). 
Likewise, the political currents which found support both in agrarian and industrial areas were 
also diverse. The Spanish trade unions originated in industrialised areas but they also grew 
rapidly in rural areas, such as Andalusia and Extremadura. Both anarcho-syndicalism and 
socialism had a significant worker base in Spain, regardless of the economic sector they 
belonged to. However, the growing trade unionism had to cope with opposite political forces in 
the aforementioned economic fields, particularly, as it has been mentioned in the historical 
overview, in the rural world and agrarianism that was influenced by conservatism contrary to 
socialism and anarcho-syndicalism. 
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Castile and Navarre are the best examples of regions where new trade unionism lacked a 
relevant support compared to other regions, likely due to the presence of conservative forces 
such as Carlism or conservative agrarianism. In Navarre, Carlist and traditionalist forces got 
approximately half of the votes during all the elections of the Second Republic. In Castile, 
conservative agrarianism also obtained a relevant amount of votes in the general elections of 
1933 and 1936 compared to other regions. By contrast, the PSOE did not obtain similar results 
in such regions compared to the nationwide average. 
Likewise, Catalonia and the Basque Country were regions where there existed a strong influence 
of peripheral nationalism. Over the course of the Republic, in Catalonia the majority of the votes 
were distributed between the ERC and the Lliga. Among all analysed regions, Catalonia was 
where the PSOE obtained the worst results. The popularity of the CNT among workers and the 
existence of the ERC, a nationalist left-wing force, may have negatively affected the PSOE. In the 
Basque Country, the PNV together with traditionalism obtained most of the votes and the PSOE 
remained below national average during all this period. The influence of the Basque trade union, 
the ELA-STV, can be pointed out as the main cause. 
Madrid, Andalusia and Extremadura are the regions closest to the vote distribution nationally. 
Starting in 1931, the Spanish party system was dominated by republican parties of several 
ideologies and the PSOE. In 1933, the republican parties and the PSOE began to lose votes. By 
contrast, the CEDA erupted strongly in the party system and in such regions, although it did not 
obtain as many votes as the PSOE or the PRR. At this stage, the main forces nationally were the 
CEDA, the PSOE and the PRR. In 1936, the political situation was even more polarized. The CEDA 
and the PSOE obtained a similar number of votes in the abovementioned regions and the IR 
emerged as third force. Nonetheless, national results were more favourable to the CEDA than 
to the PSOE, likely because of the conservative vote from Castile and Navarre, where the PSOE 
had minor support. 
From a general point of view, class cleavage intertwined largely with regional and social 
cleavages, specifically with peripheral nationalism and conservatism on religious issues. In spite 
of the class salience and the trade unionism during the Republic (see figure 3), the vote 
distribution by region shows that several ideological forces worker-oriented and peasantry-
oriented obtained different results depending on the region. Agrarianism in Castile, 
traditionalism in Navarre, anarcho-syndicalism in Catalonia or socialism in Andalusia and 
Extremadura are the best examples of the heterogeneity of class ideologies. 
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CHAPTER 3. Spanish Party System and Voting Patterns after the Dictatorship (1978-1994) 
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse a possible change in vote patterns after the ending of the 
dictatorship in relation to previously observed indicators. As can be seen during the 
development of the previous chapters, some cleavages stand out among others. 
Especially, it is remarkable how some issues, such as religion, territory (on the centralism-
peripheral axis), class and monarchy-republic, have marked the development of the party 
system throughout the entire examined period. In the following chapter, the analysis focuses on 
the aforementioned issues for the purpose of drafting conclusions about whether these social 
cleavages still influence vote patterns and to what extent. The religious issue has been pointed 
out by several authors as a determining factor in voting patterns, whilst the old class cleavage 
has lost relevance to initiate a post-materialist process (Torcal & Montero, 1997; Linz & 
Montero, 1999). 
For this part of the dissertation, some statistical analysis has been conducted using data from 
several studies of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS; Sociological Research Centre) 
between 1978 and 1994. The studies vary depending on the issues analysed, the territorial scope 
and the year. 
Firstly, it has been considered appropriate to study the ideological positions of individuals on 
most important issues, such as religion or income, in 1978 in order to outline the configuration 
of the party system nationally according to the ideological positions after the ending of the 
dictatorship. Likewise, the same methodology has been used to examine possible variations by 
region in Andalusia, Madrid and Castile.  
Secondly, a study of voting patterns in Catalonia and the Basque Country in 1983 and 1981 
respectively has been conducted. The religious issues have been included in the study of 
Catalonia. In the Basque Country this study of the religious issues could not be conducted. 
Income has been replaced by the occupation variable in both studies. The purpose is to 
determine the influence of the occupation and birthplace on voting patterns, as has been 
described in previous chapters, before the dictatorship. 
Finally, voting patterns are studied nationally in two models according to social issues that have 
been considered relevant in this period.  
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The monarchy issue is included in the two models carried out for 1985 and 1994. In the first 
model the monarchy variable is related to the value of the monarchy to provide political stability. 
In the second model the variable is a rating scale of the role of the monarchy. In addition, the 
survey of 1985 allows us to include the territorial issue as a preference scale of territorial models. 
The support for democratic or dictatorial systems is included in this model as well. 
The final models contain variables which measure the level of satisfaction with Francoism and 
the democratic transition in a rating scale. Both variables are examined as dependent on 
religion, monarchy and income. Likewise, voting patterns are analysed according to the 
aforementioned variables regarding the two main parties in 1994. 
 
3.1 Ideological Positions of Spaniards in 1978 
In 1977, the first general elections since 1936 took place. In these elections some parties that 
existed previously, such as the PSOE, the PCE and the PNV, emerged once again after having 
been acting illegally during the last years of the dictatorship. Likewise, several new parties 
appeared in the Spanish party system. Examples of these are the Alianza Popular (AP; People's 
Alliance), which later would form the base of the Partido Popular (PP; People's Party), and the 
Unión Democrática de Centro (UCD; Union of the Democratic Centre), which would split into the 
Centro Democrático y Social (CDS; Democratic and Social Centre) by 1982.  
In the first elections the UCD, led by Adolfo Suarez, won by absolute majority. The PSOE obtained 
the second largest amount of seats, followed by the PCE and the AP. Likewise, nationalist parties, 
such as the PNV and a coalition of Catalan parties called Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya (PDCP; 
Democratic Alliance for Catalonia), got a remarkable amount of votes. 
The first aim of this chapter is to define the citizens' ideological positions according to the most 
relevant social issues previously studied. This model will help us to understand how the typical 
left-right scale was ideologically distributed in Spain at the beginning of the new party system. 
Firstly, it has been chosen a multinomial regression model which measures the increase of right-
left ideological positions from 1 to 7 in relation to a dummy variable for religion, where 0 is non-
practicing Catholic and 1 is practicing Catholic, an income discrete scale from 1 to 7, and a 
continuous variable for age and another dummy variable which measures the willingness to join 
a strike (1) or not (0). 
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This model is an initial approach to illustrate the possible influence of the religious issue on 
Spanish politics, as well as age differences and the class cleavage in two dimensions; income 
disparity and strikes or riots. Table 5 shows the results obtained: 
 
 
 
 
In Table 5 it can be observed that the level of religiosity in the Catholic creed, the age and the 
willingness to join a strike were significant factors regarding the ideological positions of the 
citizens. Nonetheless, the goodness of fit is not especially high in this model. Even so, this model 
will serve to target the influence of the variables in the following models of vote patterns and to 
avoid possible problems of collinearity among explanatory variables in this kind of political 
research (see Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013: 244), concretely between ideology and other variables. 
In the previous model, the estimation of ideological positions is 0.62 for practicing Catholics. The 
age increases 0.01 as the ideological position tends to right-wing, and the estimation according 
to the willingness to join a strike is apparently negative (-0.25). By contrast, the income level 
seems to not be significant enough to acquire a specific ideological position. 
Among the significant variables of this model, religiosity, willingness to join a strike and income 
are particularly interesting. As can be observed, religion was an important issue that affected 
ideological placements to a great extent. Moreover, income and willingness to join a strike have 
been considered explanatory variables within a hypothetical class cleavage. In 1978, income 
level does not appear to largely affect Spaniards' ideology or to be a relevant component of class 
divisions.  
However, by considering the strike variable as an indicator of class mobilization, seemingly, 
there existed differences in the ideological scale. Likely, this result is strongly related to the 
change of values in class cleavages described by Torcal and Montero (1993). Their findings point 
Ideological self-placement in 1978 (1 Left-wing, 7 Right-wing) 
Variable Estimate (Std. Error) Significance (Code) 
Intercept 
Religion 
Income 
Age 
Strike 
2.36 (0.25) 
0.62 (0.08) 
0.03 (0.02) 
0.01 (0.00) 
-0.25 (0.09) 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.226 
0.000 *** 
0.005 ** 
Table 5. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1157 (N= 5350).   R squared = 0.11. Adjusted R squared = 
0.10. N= 5350. Confidence level 0.95. Significance codes *** for 0,000 – 0.001, ** for 0.001 – 0.01, * 
for 0.01 – 0.05. 
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out that class identification still continues to be relevant in Spanish society despite generational 
differences due to, partially, the change from materialism to post-materialism (Torcal & 
Montero, 1993: 3). Therefore, it is understandable, according to the findings of Torcal and 
Montero, that the model estimation for age regarding ideological positions turns out not to be 
remarkably large. 
 
3.2 Ideological Positions of Parties and Voting Patterns in 1978 
Once the first approach to the ideological scale after the dictatorship is known, it is possible to 
define party positions. Although in the newly established Spanish party system several political 
parties erupted in the first democratic elections of 1977, it is key for the research to focus on 
stronger political parties and their persistence over time. 
Nationally, as it has been mentioned, the PSOE and the PCE reappeared in the party system. The 
UCD and the AP also reappeared in the Spanish party system but, unlike the PSOE and PCE, they 
were not formal political parties before the dictatorship. Nonetheless, both the UCD and the AP 
came from different currents of the old Francoist system (see Gunther et al., 1988: 37-58).  
Table 6 shows the percentage of respondents’ answers regarding the classification of the main 
parties in an ideological scale from left-wing to right-wing: 
 
 
 
                                        
As can be observed, the ideological positions of the political parties are quite defined in the 
ideological scale. The AP classification ranges between right (59.59%) and far-right (38.62%). The 
UCD is defined by respondents as a centrist (72.84%) or right-wing party (23.83%). By contrast, 
the PSOE is located mainly in a leftist position with 80.8% of response, and just with 12.86% of 
response for the central position. According to the respondents, the PCE, similarly to the AP, 
ranges between the left (59.14%) and the far-left (36.85%). 
 Far-Left Left Centre Right Far-Right Response rate 
AP 0.17 0.80 3.89 56.49 38.62 62.42 
UCD 0.10 2.57 72.84 23.48 0.97 68.84 
PSOE 3.39 80.80 12.86 2.66 0.25 62.78 
PCE 36.85 59.14 3.03 0.71 0.24 67.66 
Table 6. Ideological Placement of Political Parties (%) in 1978. Prepared by the author based on CIS 
1157 (N= 5350).   
 59 
According to the results shown in Table 5, the AP and the UCD slightly shared the right position, 
even though the UCD is placed primarily in the centre. The most remarkable case is that of the 
PSOE and the PCE, which largely share the left position. The central classification for the PSOE is 
minimal and the PCE is not classified by respondents as a purely far-left political party. 
It is important to emphasise that, during the first years of the democratic transition, the PSOE 
kept its Marxist ideology but then it slowly moved towards the social democrat ideologies of the 
rest of the socialist parties of the time (Aguiar, 2006: 15). This is a good explanation as to why 
the PSOE and the PCE were ideologically close for Spanish society. In order to complete the 
ideological classification of the political parties, a multinomial logit analysis of voting patterns 
regarding the aforementioned political parties has been conducted, using the survey of 1978. 
The multinomial logit analyses conducted are based on the paper of Croissant (2011) for 
multinomial logit models. 
As explanatory variables the ideological scale from 0 to 7 studied in Table 5 has been included, 
as well as the income variable, which did not provide relevant results in the multinomial model 
conducted in Table 5. All explanatory variables in the following model are individual. Other 
variables, such as religiosity, willingness to join a strike and age, have been removed from the 
model in order to avoid possible problems of collinearity with the main explanatory variable: 
ideology. 
The dependent variable of alternatives is based on the question “which party would you vote 
for if general elections were held today?”. In Table 7 the results obtained for two reference 
alternatives are shown. In this model, it has been deemed convenient to choose the PSOE and 
the UCD, as they are the two parties with the highest frequency, with 43% and 26% respectively.
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As one might expect, the variable of ideology has a high level of significance for all alternatives. 
Likewise, the variable of income is significant just for the political party AP. Taking the PSOE as 
reference, the estimation of ideology increases from left-wing to right-wing 1.84 for the AP and 
1.14 for the UCD. However, the estimation of ideology decreases 0.75 for the PCE. These results 
are similar to the data shown in Table 6, where the ideological distance between the PSOE and 
the PCE was smaller than between the UCD and the AP because they largely shared the left 
position.  
In addition, the income variable is significant for the AP compared to the PSOE. The estimation 
shows that the income increases 0.20 for the AP voters if we compare it to the PSOE. 
Nevertheless, income is not as significant for the rest of the parties as for PSOE. 
By using the UCD as reference level, it can be observed that the ideological distance of the voters 
of the AP increases 0.70 towards the right-wing position. This case is in line with the data in 
Table 5 and is similar to the results obtained for the PSOE and PCE. Compared to the UCD, the 
ideology decreases 1.14 for the PSOE voters and 1.90 for the PCE supporters. 
Reference level: PSOE 
Party: (Variable)  Estimate (Std. Error) Significance (Code) 
AP:(Intercept) 
PCE:(Intercept) 
UCD:(Intercept) 
AP: (Ideology) 
PCE: (Ideology) 
UCD: (Ideology) 
AP: (Income) 
PCE: (Income) 
UCD: (Income) 
-9.92 (0.88) 
1.04 (0.53) 
-4.88 (0.56) 
1.84 (0.15) 
-0.75 (0.13) 
1.14 (0.11) 
0.20 (0.08) 
0.01 (0.07) 
0.02 (0.06) 
0.000 *** 
0.004 * 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.014 * 
0.814 
0.659 
 
Reference level: UCD  
AP:(Intercept) 
PCE:(Intercept) 
PSOE:(Intercept) 
AP:(Ideology) 
PCE: (Ideology) 
PSOE:(Ideology) 
AP:(Income) 
PCE: (Income) 
PSOE: (Income) 
-5.03 (0.78) 
5.93 (0.72) 
4.88 (0.56) 
0.70 (0.12) 
-1.90 (0.16) 
-1.14 (0.11) 
0.17 (0.07) 
-0.01 (0.08) 
-0.02 (0.06) 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.016 * 
0.905 
0.659 
Table 7. Voting patterns in 1978. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1157 (N= 5350). McFadden R 
squared = 0.23. Log-Likelihood = -643.63. Frequency of parties PSOE 0.43 AP 0.13 PCE 0.16 UCD 0.26. 
Confidence level 0.95. Significance codes *** for 0,000 – 0.001, ** for 0.001 – 0.01, * for 0.01 – 0.05. 
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Similarly to the PSOE case, income is significant and increases 0.17 for the AP voters compared 
to the UCD. For the rest of the parties it is still irrelevant. It seems that income does not largely 
influence ideological positions but it influences the voting patterns regarding the AP.    
The reason why the voters of the AP were characterised by a slight higher income compared to 
the voters of the rest of the parties can be found in the structure and the history of the party. 
According to Gunther et al. (1988: 78-92), the AP structure was formed by the old elites of 
Francoism and society which, despite its reformist and democratic character, defended several 
conservative positions. Although the UCD was also formed by a sector of Francoism, according 
to Gunther, the UCD leaders were mostly progressive and they were not a clientelist 
organization as the AP was. Therefore, the closeness of the AP to the old elites, whether political 
or economic, can be a good explanation for the higher income of AP voters. 
The leverage of each political party with different social groups is illustrated in the following 
table: 
 
 
 
 
Firstly, it is noticeable that the AP is the political party with the highest estimation of vote among 
the executive group. In addition, in the group of the upper-level employees, the AP still has a 
relevant percentage. Nonetheless, its estimation of vote decreases abruptly in the lower 
occupational categories. 
The voting patterns clearly show a large support for the AP by high-level occupational groups 
and very little support by middle-level employees, workers and farmworkers. Moreover, the 
PSOE and the UCD had similar support from all occupational categories. The PSOE is ahead of 
the UCD in all categories, except in the category of farmworkers, where the share of the UCD is 
slightly higher than that of the PSOE. These results point out that the countryside was mostly 
 PCE PSOE UCD AP NA and others 
Executives 7.22 18.07 15.66 19.27 39.88 
Upper-level employees 3.00 22.00 20.00 15.00 40.00 
Middle-level employees 6.27 20.92 17.99 2.92 51.90 
Skilled workers 8.52 28.58 14.34 2.61 45.95 
Unskilled workers 6.51 23.48 15.34 3.25 51.42 
Farmworkers 8.18 19.88 20.46 4.38 47.10 
Table 8. Distribution of Vote (%) by occupational group in 1978. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1157 
(N= 5350).   
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conservative, unlike other lower professional categories as skilled and unskilled workers, where 
the PSOE apparently took advantage.  
Finally, the support to the PCE was approximately evenly distributed over all occupational 
categories. However, the PCE voters were limited compared to the PSOE or the UCD and to the 
AP in higher categories. 
In Table 8 it can be seen that the PSOE and the UCD attracted most voters in all categories, 
except in higher categories, where the AP was predominant. Middle classes represented by 
middle-level employees were divided between the PSOE and the UCD. Typical working class 
groups, like the skilled and unskilled workers, also supported the PSOE and the UCD. Likewise, 
the farmworkers had a similar voting pattern. As happened before the dictatorship, the PCE 
lacked major support from the working classes. By contrast, the PSOE appeared to have the 
mastery of the left-wing workers. 
Summarizing the results, it can be stated that all the political parties of the new party system, 
except the AP, were equally distributed across the main occupational categories. As shown in 
Table 7, there existed a significant difference of income for AP voters compared to the rest of 
the political parties and this result can be verified by looking at the data of Table 8. 
 
3.3 Voting patterns in Madrid, Andalusia and Castile 1978 
Another point of interest for this research are the territorial differences of voting. As has been 
seen in chapter 2, before 1936 the voting patterns varied by region. Thanks to the large sample 
and the structure of the survey of 1978, different regions of Spain can be analysed with a proper 
level of confidence according to the population by region at that time. 
In the first instance, the study focuses on the voting patterns of Andalusia, Madrid and Castile 
in 1978 and, separately, on those of Catalonia and the Basque Country in later years. It has been 
deemed crucial to examine deeply the case of Catalonia and the Basque Country due to the 
presence of nationalism and parties that do not exist nationally. The survey of 1978 does not 
provide data for previous purposes, consequently, concrete surveys have been used for the 
aforementioned regions in different years. 
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The multinomial logit model shown in Table 7 has been put together by using stratified sampling 
of Andalusia, Madrid and Castile, taking as reference level the PSOE as main party. Table 9 shows 
the results obtained: 
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Voting patterns in Andalusia, Madrid and Castile. Year 1978. Reference level PSOE. 
 
 
Table 9. Voting patterns by region in 1978. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1157(N= 5350). Reference level PSOE. 
Confidence level 0.95. Significance codes *** for 0,000 – 0.001, ** for 0.001 – 0.01, * for 0.01 – 0.05. 
 
 
ANDALUSIA  
Party: (Variable) Estimate (Std. Error) Significance (Code) 
AP:(Intercept) 
PCE:(Intercept) 
UCD:(Intercept) 
AP: (Ideology) 
PCE: (Ideology) 
UCD: (Ideology) 
AP: (Income) 
PCE: (Income) 
UCD: (Income) 
-12.76 (1.64) 
0.50 (0.74) 
-5.15 (0.87) 
2.66 (0.32) 
-0.70 (0.20) 
1.35 (0.20) 
1.35 (0.20) 
0.10 (0.10) 
-0.04 (0.09) 
0.000 *** 
0.499 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.775 
0.350 
0.612 
N= 884. McFadden R squared 0.26. Log Likelihood -278.54. Frequency PSOE 0.45 AP 0.11 PCE 
0.17 UCD 0.26. 
 
MADRID  
AP:(Intercept) 
PCE:(Intercept) 
UCD:(Intercept) 
AP: (Ideology) 
PCE: (Ideology) 
UCD: (Ideology) 
AP: (Income) 
PCE: (Income) 
UCD: (Income) 
-12.19 (2.20) 
1.68 (0.99) 
-6.14 (1.31) 
1.98 (0.36) 
-0.59 (0.20) 
1.20 (0.24) 
0.45 (0.18) 
-0.14 (0.13) 
0.16 (0.13) 
0.000 *** 
0.090 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.004 ** 
0.000 *** 
0.016 * 
0.284 
0.209 
N= 456. McFadden R squared 0.22. Log Likelihood -173.53. Frequency PSOE 0.46 AP 0.10 PCE 
0.22 UCD 0.20. 
 
CASTILE 
  
AP:(Intercept) 
PCE:(Intercept) 
UCD:(Intercept) 
AP: (Ideology) 
PCE: (Ideology) 
UCD: (Ideology) 
AP: (Income) 
PCE: (Income) 
UCD: (Income) 
-7.44 (1.34) 
2.78 (1.46) 
-4.80 (1.06) 
1.27 (0.21) 
-1.37 (0.40) 
0.97 (0.18) 
0.25 (0.14) 
-0.08 (0.17) 
0.13 (0.13) 
0.000 *** 
0.057 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.083  
0.651 
0.301 
N= 459. McFadden R squared 0.23. Log Likelihood -175.89. Frequency PSOE 0.37 AP 0.19 PCE 
0.10 UCD 0.32.  
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In all religions examined in Table 9, the ideological variables of the respondents are highly 
significant. Nonetheless, regional variations exist in the grade of ideological change of 
individuals regarding the political parties studied. 
For example, in Andalusia the voters of AP, compared to the PSOE, are located more towards 
the right-wing positions (2.66) than in Madrid (1.98) and Castile (1.27). This regional variation 
also exists in the UCD voters compared to the PSOE. The estimation for UCD voters compared 
to the PSOE in Andalusia is 1.35, whilst it is 1.20 in Madrid and 0.97 in Castile. By contrast, the 
estimation for PCE voters compared to the PSOE is -0.70 in Andalusia and -0.59 in Madrid; 
however, it is -1.37 in Castile. 
The income variable is not significant in Andalusia and Castile but it is significant for AP voters 
compared to the PSOE in Madrid, with an estimation of 0.45. Conversely to national results 
shown in Table 7, by conducting the same model by regions, significant differences can be seen 
in the level of estimates, and even in the significance of variables. 
By looking at the distribution of the variables examined in Table 9, it is possible to indicate where 
the differences lie:  
 
Figure 6. Distribution of Ideology and Income by Region in 1978. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1157 (N=5350). 
Ideological scale (1) Far-left (7) Far-right. Income scale 1-9 (see appendix 1 for income intervals).  
In Figure 6, the ideological distribution of Andalusia and Madrid tends towards the left-wing 
whilst, in Castile, it seems to be normally distributed. Likewise, the presence of outliers in right 
and left positions in Andalusia and Madrid can be observed. This helps to explain the greater 
ideological distance from left-wing to right-wing positions between AP and UCD voters 
compared to PSOE voters in Madrid and Andalusia. 
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Regarding the income distribution, Andalusia and Castile tend towards low income levels 
whereas Madrid has more high income levels compared to the lowest. Levels of income lower 
than average, apparently, did not affect the influence of the income variable in Castile and 
Andalusia between the AP and the PSOE regarding the voting patterns. Nonetheless, as 
happened in Madrid, a greater income level seems to increase the influence of the income on 
the voting patterns between the AP and the PSOE. Likewise, it is interesting to note that, 
according to the frequency of the alternatives displayed in Table 9, Madrid was the region with 
the lowest support for the AP (10%), whilst in Andalusia it was 11% and in Castile 19%.  
This shows that, presumably, the voting patterns varied regionally in the case of the AP, since 
the income variable is significant in Madrid but does not explain the AP vote in Andalusia and 
Castile, therefore, the AP vote in Castile and Andalusia was based on other causes. 
Previous results are strongly linked to historical facts described in previous chapters. Voting 
patterns in predominant agrarian regions of mainly low income might still be based on 
conservative issues rather than on income differences. By contrast, in industrialised regions such 
as Madrid, income and class differences could have defined voting patterns in 1978. 
 
3.4 Voting Patterns in the Basque Country 1981 
The Basque Country is an interesting case since, together with Catalonia, it had a strong 
nationalist movement before the dictatorship. As it has been already seen, the PNV was the 
biggest nationalist party and, at the beginning of the democracy, it remained the strongest 
nationalist party in the Basque Country. 
Likewise, left-wing nationalist political parties emerged again. The ANV formed a coalition with 
other leftist forces in 1978, called Herri Batasuna (HB; Popular Unity). Furthermore, the 
Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE; Basque Left) was also born into the nationalist left of the Basque Country 
vying with the HB. 
The rest of the national parties were also present in the Basque Country. The PSOE and the PCE 
continued to attract large amounts of votes in the Basque Country, as had occurred before the 
dictatorship. Similarly, the UCD and the AP were also represented in Basque politics. 
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For the purpose of confirming if the voting patterns are based on the ones before the 
dictatorship, in the model the birthplace has been chosen because it is a key point described in 
chapter 1. As has been pointed out, the origin of the population, mainly due to the emigration 
of non-Basque workers to the Basque Country in order to work in the industry, provided a large 
support towards non-purely nationalist parties, such as the PSOE and the PCE (see Heiberg, 
1989; Kasmir, 1996).  
A multinomial logit model has been put together using the survey of 1981 (CIS 1276) regarding 
the main national parties (AP, UCD, PSOE and PCE) and the nationalist parties (PNV, HB and EE). 
As explanatory variables, we have chosen to base the model on a dummy variable of birthplace, 
in which 0 is born in the Basque Country and 1 is in the rest of Spain, and a scalar discrete variable 
for occupational categories, in which 4 is the highest (executives) and 1 is the lowest (unskilled 
workers) (see appendix 2 for full categories caption). The dependent variable of alternatives is 
based on the question “which party would you vote for if general elections were held today?”. 
Individual variables about conservative issues, such as religion, have not been included in the 
model because the survey does not provide data. Likewise, it has been avoided to include the 
respondents' ideology as explanatory variable because of potential inferences with the 
occupational categories. Therefore, the model setting has been carried out looking for a deep 
explanatory power on origin and professional category of the voting patterns in the Basque 
Country. 
The PSOE, the PNV and the HB have been selected as reference levels of the model when 
displaying the results. The reason lies in the PSOE being the most frequent alternative and the 
PNV and the HB being, respectively, the main right-wing and left-wing nationalist parties. The 
AP alternative has been excluded from the model in order to avoid fitting errors, since it only 
represents 1% of the votes in the Basque Country. 
Table 10 shows the results obtained by the PSOE, the PNV and the HB as reference levels and 
the previous explanatory variables:  
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Table 10. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1276 (N= 964). Mc Fadden r squared 0.15. Log Likelihood -301.22. Frequency of parties HB 0.05 EE 0.05 PCE 0.07 PNV 0.31 PSOE 
0.33 UCD 0.17. Confidence level 0.95. Significance codes *** for 0,000 – 0.001, ** for 0.001 – 0.01, * for 0.01 – 0.05. 
Voting patterns in the Basque Country. Year 1981. 
    Reference level PSOE Reference level PNV Reference level HB 
Party: Variable Estimate  
(Std. Error) 
Significance (code) Estimate  
(Std. Error) 
Significance (code) Estimate  
(Std. Error) 
Significance (code) 
EE: (Intercept) 
HB: (Intercept) 
PCE: (Intercept) 
PSOE: (Intercept) 
PNV: (Intercept) 
UCD: (Intercept) 
EE: (Birthplace) 
HB: (Birthplace) 
PCE: (Birthplace) 
PSOE: (Birthplace) 
PNV: (Birthplace) 
UCD: (Birthplace) 
EE: (Occupation) 
HB: (Occupation) 
PCE: (Occupation) 
PSOE: (Occupation) 
PNV: (Occupation) 
UCD: (Occupation) 
0.54 (1.48) 
2.52 (1.44) 
-1.02 (1.15) 
- 
2.45 (0.79) 
-2.74 (0.93) 
-2.90 (1.07) 
-2.92 (1.07) 
0.08 (0.56) 
- 
-3.02 (0.52) 
0.45 (0.42) 
0.65 (0.33) 
-0.30 (0.39) 
-0.34 (0.35) 
- 
0.62 (0.21) 
0.62 (0.22) 
0.711 
0.080 
0.375 
- 
0.001 ** 
0.003 ** 
0.006 ** 
0.006 ** 
0.884 
- 
0.000 *** 
0.287 
0.050 * 
0.441 
0.331 
- 
0.003 ** 
0.004 ** 
-1.90 (1.51) 
-0.06 (1.48) 
-3.47 (1.21) 
-2.45 (0.79) 
- 
-5.19 (1.02) 
0.11 (1.14) 
0.09 (1.14) 
3.10 (0.69) 
3.02 (0.52) 
- 
3.47 (0.57) 
0.02 (0.31) 
-0.93 (0.38) 
-0.96 (0.36) 
-0.62 (0.21) 
- 
0.00 (0.23) 
0.210 
0.962 
0.004 ** 
0.001 ** 
- 
0.000 *** 
0.919  
0.930 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.000 *** 
0.929 
0.016 * 
0.008 ** 
0.003 ** 
- 
0.997 
-1.97 (1.94) 
- 
-3.54 (1.70) 
-2.52 (1.44) 
-0.06 (1.48) 
-5.26 (1.60) 
0.01 (1.48) 
- 
3.00 (1.16) 
2.92 (1.07) 
-0.09 (1.14) 
3.37 (1.10) 
0.96 (0.46) 
- 
-0.03 (0.49) 
0.30 (0.39) 
0.93 (0.39) 
0.93  (0.41) 
0.309 
- 
0.037 * 
0.080 
0.962 
0.001 ** 
0.992 
- 
0.009 ** 
0.006 ** 
0.930 
0.002 ** 
0.039 * 
- 
0.941 
0.441 
0.016 * 
0.025 * 
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Taking the PSOE as reference level and the birthplace as explanatory variable, it can be observed 
that the birthplace has only significance compared to the aforementioned nationalist parties: 
the PNV, the HB and the EE. By contrast, the vote related to the birthplace for national parties 
(the UCD and the PCE) lacks significance. 
As might be expected, the estimation for the significant alternatives is negative, meaning that 
the vote for nationalist parties compared to the PSOE is more likely for respondents born in the 
Basque Country. It should be noted that the value of the estimates is almost equal for the HB (-
2.92), the EE (-2.90) and the PNV (-3.02). Then, concerning the PSOE, there were no great 
differences in the vote related to the birthplace among the three main nationalist parties. 
Regarding the professional occupation variable, only the UCD, the EE and the PNV hold 
significance compared to the PSOE. All of them have positive estimates; consequently, the 
expected estimation of vote for the UCD, the EE and the PNV compared to the PSOE increases 
in higher professional categories. Like in the previous variable, the estimates are almost equal 
among political parties. The UCD, just as the PNV, has 0.62 and the EE 0.65. 
If the PNV is taken as reference level, the voting patterns are conceptually similar to the previous 
reference level. The likelihood of voting for national parties compared to the PNV increases 
equally for respondents born outside the Basque Country. The estimation for the UCD is slightly 
greater (3.47) than for the PSOE (3.02) and the PCE (3.10). The EE and the HB vote related to 
birthplace is not significant setting the PNV as reference level. 
However, regarding the occupational variable, only the HB, the PSOE and the PCE have enough 
statistical significance. The expected value of vote for the HB compared to the PNV is -0.93, -
0.96 for the PCE and -0.62 for the PSOE. These results illustrate that the likelihood of voting for 
the PSOE, the PCE and the HB is reduced in higher occupational categories. 
Finally, if the HB is taken as reference level, the birthplace variable has explanatory power for 
the PSOE, the PCE and the UCD. Like in the case of the PNV, the estimates are positive and 
similar, which means more likelihood of voting for the referred political parties in respondents 
born outside the Basque Country. 
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The occupational variable is only significant for the EE, the PNV and the UCD. The estimates are 
0.96 for the EE, 0.93 for the PNV and 0.93 for the UCD. Therefore, the expected values are 
positive, meaning that the likelihood of voting for the EE, the PNV and the UCD increases in 
higher professional categories compared to the HB. 
Regarding the model adjustment, the McFadden R squared is 0.15, what represents an adequate 
fit for our purposes taking into account that it has not been possible to include other variables 
such as religion that, presumably, could have improved the adjustment and displayed new 
divisions among vote alternatives. 
In general, the voting patterns of the Basque Country in 1981 were clearly divided by origin and 
professional categories. 
Firstly, there is a division between nationalist parties, formed by the PNV, the HB and the EE, 
and non-nationalist parties, such as the UCD, the PSOE and the PCE, regarding the birthplace 
variable. Although the birthplace variable does not explicitly mean support for Basque 
nationalism, the respondents born in the Basque Country tend to support to a great extent the 
nationalist parties. 
Secondly, another division arises from the professional categories and overlaps the voting 
patterns related to origin. In higher occupational categories is more likely to vote for the UCD, 
the PNV and the EE than for the PSOE, the PCE and the HB. 
Table 10 confirms that, as happened before the dictatorship, in 1981 voters of lower 
professional categories and non-Basque origin were mainly distributed among the PSOE and the 
PCE. On the other hand, the HB attracted the lower-level professionals of Basque origin. In 
higher professional categories, the UCD was supported by non-Basque employees. Furthermore, 
the PNV and the EE shared the vote of Basque upper-level professionals. Consequently, the 
political division of voters of the PNV and the EE could lie in the socialist and Marxist features of 
the EE and the conservatism of the PNV. 
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3.5 Voting Patterns in Catalonia 1983 
Catalonia has been analysed from the same perspective as the Basque Country. The aim of the 
analysis is to highlight the influence of origin and occupation on the voting patterns. As in the 
Basque Country, the main reason behind this kind of modelling is to verify if voting patterns are 
influenced by the occupational categories and the birthplace of voters. 
However, unlike the case of the Basque Country, in chapter 2 it was shown that the vote in 
Catalonia was mainly distributed between the two main nationalist parties: the Lliga and the 
ERC. Likewise, the PSOE, which during the democratic transition obtained a great amount of 
votes from Catalonia, was a minor political party before the dictatorship. According to some 
authors (see Linz, 1967: 258; Anguera, 2001), the conclusive reasons stated in chapters 1 and 2 
were that the power of anarcho-syndicalism in Catalonia and the birth of modern nationalism 
did not leave political bases for non-nationalist workers’ parties, such as the PSOE or the PCE. 
It is important to note that during the dictatorship and at the beginning of the democratic 
transition there existed internal migratory flows, mainly from southern regions of Spain to 
Catalonia, as well as to the Basque Country (see Capel, 1967: 81-83; Acosta, 2001: 43-48). The 
migration to the Catalan industrial areas was especially relevant in Catalonia during the 60s and 
70s. 
The CIS 1527 survey carried out in Catalonia in 1983 (N= 2399) has been used. The survey 
provides data regarding birthplace, occupational categories and, also, religiosity levels. Previous 
issues, such as the individual explanatory variables of voting patterns in Catalonia, have been 
taken into account. As an independent variable the following question has been used: “which 
party would you vote for if general elections were held tomorrow?” As has been done 
previously, the variable of individual ideology has not been included with the purpose of 
avoiding errors of collinearity with other explanatory variables. 
The birthplace variable is dummy, where 1 is born in Catalonia and 2 is born outside Catalonia. 
In this case, the occupational variable is divided in five professional categories, where 1 is 
unskilled workers and 5 businesspeople. The religiosity variable is a discrete scale from 1 to 3, in 
which 1 is non-believer, 2 is practising Catholic and 3 is non-practising Catholic. 
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The PSOE has been selected as the first reference alternative because it was the most frequent 
alternative. Moreover, the two main political parties have also been chosen as reference levels. 
Firstly, the CIU, that might be considered to be the heir of the Lliga Catalana after the 
dictatorship, and secondly, the ERC, that emerged again during the democratic transition. 
The following table shows the results obtained from the aforementioned model:
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Table 11. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1527 (N= 2399). Mc Fadden r squared 0.13. Log-likelihood -520.88. Frequencies of parties CIU 0.26 AP 0.07 ERC 0.07 CDS/UCD 
0.06 PSC/PSOE 0.45 PSUC/PCE 0.07. Confidence level 0.95. Significance codes *** for 0,000 – 0.001, ** for 0.001 – 0.01, * for 0.01 – 0.05.
Voting patterns in Catalonia. Year 1983. 
 Reference level PSC/PSOE Reference level CIU Reference level ERC 
Party: Variable Estimate (Std. Error) Significance (code) Estimate (Std. Error) Significance (code) Estimate (Std. Error) Significance (code) 
AP: (Intercept) 
PSC/PSOE: (Intercept) 
CDS/UCD: (Intercept) 
CIU: (Intercept) 
ERC: (Intercept) 
PSUC/PCE: (Intercept) 
AP: (Religion) 
PSC/PSOE: (Religion) 
CDS/UCD: (Religion) 
CIU: (Religion) 
ERC: (Religion) 
PSUC/PCE: (Religion) 
AP: (Birthplace) 
PSC/PSOE: (Birthplace) 
CDS/UCD: (Birthplace) 
CIU: (Birthplace) 
ERC: (Birthplace) 
PSUC/PCE: (Birthplace) 
AP: (Occupation) 
PSC/PSOE: (Occupation) 
CDS/UCD: (Occupation) 
CIU: (Occupation) 
ERC: (Occupation) 
PSUC/PCE: (Occupation) 
-5.04 (1.23) 
- 
-4.20 (1.21) 
0.14 (0.72) 
2.44 (1.36) 
0.56 (1.36) 
1.11 (0.35) 
- 
0.24 (0.35) 
0.58 (0.22) 
-0.22 (0.33) 
-1.49 (0.34) 
-0.17 (0.41) 
- 
0.40 (0.43) 
-2.25( 0.35) 
-3.50 (1.02) 
-0.22 (0.40) 
0.33 (0.13) 
- 
0.39 (0.14) 
0.33 (0.09) 
0.16 (0.14) 
0.31 (0.14) 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.000 *** 
0.841 
0.073 
0.551 
0.001 ** 
- 
0.484 
0.009 ** 
0.507 
0.000 *** 
0.665 
- 
0.361 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.581 
0.012 * 
- 
0.005 ** 
0.000 *** 
0.251 
0.033 * 
-5.18 (1.30) 
-0.14 (0.72) 
-4.34 (1.29) 
- 
2.30 (1.42) 
0.42 (1.05) 
0.53 (0.37) 
-0.58 (0.22) 
-0.33 (0.37) 
- 
-0.80 (0.34) 
-2.07 (0.37) 
2.07 (0.49) 
2.25 (0.35) 
2.65 (0.51) 
- 
-1.24 (1.06) 
2.02 (0.50) 
-0.00 (0.13) 
-0.33 (0.09) 
0.06 (0.14) 
- 
-0.17 (0.14) 
-0.02 (0.15) 
0.000 *** 
0.841 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.105 
0.684 
0.156 
0.009 ** 
0.379 
- 
0.018 * 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.009 *** 
0.379 
- 
0.242 
0.000 *** 
0.971 
0.000 *** 
0.686 
- 
0.221 
0.862 
-7.48 (1.76) 
-2.44 (1.36) 
-6.64 (1.75) 
-2.30 (1.42) 
- 
-1.87 (1.55) 
1.33 (0.45) 
0.22 (0.33) 
0.46 (0.45) 
0.80 (0.34) 
- 
-1.27 (0.43) 
3.32 (1.08) 
3.50 (1.02) 
3.90 (1.09) 
1.24 (1.06) 
- 
3.27 (1.08) 
0.16 (0.17) 
-0.16 (0.14) 
0.23 (0.18) 
0.17 (0.14) 
- 
0.14 (0.18) 
0.000 *** 
0.073 
0.000 *** 
0.105 
- 
0.226 
0.003 ** 
0.507 
0.304 
0.018 * 
- 
0.003 ** 
0.002 ** 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.242 
- 
0.002 ** 
0.343 
0.251 
0.211 
0.221 
- 
0.431 
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Noting the results displayed, it can be seen that all explanatory variables had some grade of 
significance in several alternatives and reference levels. 
Beginning with the PSOE reference level and the religiosity variable, there exists statistical 
significance in the AP, the CIU and the PCE compared to the PSOE. As might be expected, in 
conservative parties such as the AP and the CIU, the estimation for religiosity increases 1.11 for 
the AP and 0.58 for the CIU compared to the PSOE. Moreover, the estimation for the PCE is -
1.59 compared to the PSOE. It is important to note that for the CDS/UCD, compared to the PSOE 
alternative, there are not significant differences regarding the religious issue. Previous results 
illustrate the position held by the PSOE voters on the religious issue concerning the rest of the 
parties. The PSOE vote related to religion was located in a middle position between the 
conservative parties (the AP and the CIU) and the PCE. Furthermore, the differences in the 
religiosity level between the ERC and the CDS/UCD voters compared to the PSOE voters are 
irrelevant. 
Turning now to the birthplace variable, predictably, both nationalist parties have differences of 
significance with the PSOE alternative. Estimates for the ERC and the CIU are -3.50 and -2.25 
respectively, meaning that the probability to vote for the ERC and the CIU compared to the PSOE 
increases for individuals born in Catalonia. Likewise, there is no statistical relevance regarding 
birthplace linked to the PSOE alternative for the rest of the national parties. 
Finally, the occupational category variable generates conclusive results. The AP, the CDS/UCD, 
the CIU and, remarkably, the PCE had positive and significant estimates. The estimates are 
approximately equal among them, compared to the PSOE alternative. The conclusion derived 
from those results is that the likelihood of voting for the AP, the CDS/UCD, the CIU and the PCE 
increased in higher occupational categories compared to the PSOE. 
The results obtained about the PSOE and the PCE are particularly interesting. If we take a close 
look at the three explanatory variables, the differences between the PSOE and the PCE lie in the 
religiosity level and in the occupational category of voters. Whilst it is more likely to find PSOE 
voters in lower occupational categories with a greater religiosity level and not born in Catalonia, 
the PCE voters are upper-level employees with a lower religiosity level than the rest of the 
parties analysed and they are not born in Catalonia. Contrary to the intuitive relationships 
between the PSOE and the PCE, in Catalonia, the PSOE seemed to attract more voters among 
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lower-level employees than the PCE which, presumably, attracted more voters based on lowest 
level of religiosity than on professional category. 
Establishing the CIU as reference level, all variables have some explanatory power. Religion is 
significant for the PSOE, the ERC and the PCE compared to the CIU. The biggest religious distance 
lies between the PCE and the CIU. The expected value of choosing the PCE compared to the CIU 
decreases -2.07 as the religiosity increases. Moreover, the estimates for the PSOE are -0.59 and 
-0.80 for the ERC regarding the religious issue. 
Regarding the birthplace variable, the origin affects the voting patterns for the AP, the PCE and 
the PSOE compared to the CIU. The likelihood to vote for the AP, the PCE and the PSOE increases 
in voters born outside Catalonia compared to the CIU voters. 
Furthermore, it is important to notice that the CDS/UCD lacks statistical significance regarding 
the birthplace variable compared to the CIU. This is particularly striking since the CDS/UCD was 
a non-nationalist national party. Likewise, voting patterns in the Basque Country (see Table 10) 
clearly displayed a division regarding the birthplace variable among the main nationalist parties 
(the PNV and the HB) and the UCD.  
Turning now to the occupational variable, the PSOE is the only party which has a statistical 
significance of -0.33 compared to the CIU. The rest of the alternatives, including the ERC, have 
no significant choosing patterns related to the occupational category. 
Overall, the three dependent variables included in the model explain the division of voting 
compared to the CIU concerning the PSOE (religion, birthplace and occupational category), the 
PCE (birthplace and religion), the ERC (religion) and the AP (birthplace). However, the model is 
unable to explain the choice patterns of the CDS/UCD compared to the CIU that, apparently, are 
based on other explanatory variables. 
Finally, taking the ERC as reference level, the religion variable shows significance for the AP and 
the CIU alternatives. The estimates are positive for the AP (1.33) and the CIU (0.80). 
Consequently, the likelihood of voting for the AP compared to the ERC is greater than to the CIU 
compared to the ERC and increases in higher religiosity levels. On the other hand, the PCE 
estimate on the religiosity scale is negative compared to the ERC (-1.27). Once the analysis of 
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the three reference levels is finished, it can be stated that the PCE was the party with the least 
religious supporters of the three alternatives examined. 
The birthplace variable is significant, positive and approximately similar for all national political 
parties compared to the ERC. It is interesting to note that, unlike the CIU alternative, the 
estimate compared to the ERC for the CDS/UCD is significant and the highest (3.90) of the rest 
of the national political parties. This result shows that the vote for the two main nationalist 
parties (the CIU and the ERC) compared to the CDS/UCD was much more polarized regarding 
the birthplace variable for the ERC than for the CIU. 
Regarding the occupational variable, this variable is not significant for any political alternative 
compared to the ERC, meaning that the vote for the ERC compared to the rest of the political 
parties was not influenced by the occupational group of voters. 
Once the results have been evaluated, it can be stated that the vote for the ERC compared to 
the rest of the parties examined was influenced in two dimensions (religion and birthplace), 
whilst the occupational category does not appear to be significant. The religiosity level 
influenced the vote for the AP and the CIU compared to the ERC. Moreover, the birthplace 
variable divided the vote between all national parties and the ERC. 
By comparing the results obtained in 1983 with the voting patterns before the dictatorship, it 
can be observed that the PSOE attracted the majority of votes from lower occupational 
categories and people born outside Catalonia, something that was caused, presumably, by the 
immigration from other Spanish regions to Catalonia during the dictatorship. The PCE did not 
attract voters from lower occupational categories; by contrast, the PCE voters were upper-level 
professionals, born outside Catalonia and non-religious. Consequently, unlike before the 
dictatorship, the PSOE monopolised to a large extent the support of unskilled and skilled 
workers. 
The rest of the parties were divided regarding other issues such as religion and birthplace. As 
happened with the Lliga during 1930s, the CIU attracted the vote from Catalan voters, religious 
people and, mainly, upper-level professionals compared to the PSOE. The ERC attracted votes 
from lower professional and Catalan voters, less religious people and from several economic 
groups. At this point, it can be stated that the differences between the two nationalist parties 
lie in social and conservative cleavages more than in a class cleavage. 
 77 
The vote for national parties and nationalist parties was clearly divided by birthplace, except for 
the CDS/UCD and the CIU. The reasons why voters chose the CDS/UCD or the CIU could not be 
explained by our explanatory variables. Religiosity, birthplace and occupational categories seem 
to be similar for the CIU and the CDS/UCD voters. Perhaps the levels of agreement with 
nationalism or regarding territorial issues rather than the birthplace are a good explanatory 
variable for this case. 
In conclusion, voting patterns in Catalonia varied after the dictatorship but social cleavages 
appear to be similar. Religion continues to play an important role in voting and affects voting 
among main nationalist and national political parties. The birthplace shows the cleavage 
between two groups of nationalist and non-nationalist parties in most cases. The class cleavage 
has weakened since it does not affect most parties except the PSOE, which occupied the place 
of the anarcho-syndicalists and attracted supporters from lower occupational categories, 
probably due to the immigration from other regions 
 
3.4 Voting Patterns regarding Monarchy, Territory and Sociological Francoism 
In previous chapters, the voting patterns concerning several variables have been studied. The 
results obtained from the models show that religion or income influenced, to a greater or lesser 
extent, the vote during the first years of the democratic transition. Other variables taken into 
account, such as the willingness to join a strike, illustrate possible divisions related to the rupture 
of the old political regime in 1978. Likewise, voting differences continued to be salient, both in 
inner regions and in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Income, occupational category and 
birthplace continued to affect the vote variations by region. 
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify voting patterns related to previous concepts by using 
more suitable and accurate variables. To this end, religiosity and income have been kept as 
explanatory variables of vote alternatives because of their statistical significance. Moreover, 
besides religiosity and income, new variables from data of survey CIS 1441 of 1985 and CIS 2084 
of 1994 have been introduced. 
New variables of survey CIS 1441 of 1985 are a scale of preference among various forms of 
territorial organisations, democracy support and a dummy variable regarding the role of 
monarchy to ensure order and security. Such variables have been chosen with the aim to provide 
a better and extensive insight with regard to territorial cleavage, democracy and monarchy. 
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Likewise, a key point of this research lies in the influence of the previous regime on Spanish 
democracy. This issue has been addressed by using the new variables of the surveys of 1985 and 
1994.  
Firstly, the variables of 1985 about preferences regarding political regime and the monarchy as 
guarantor of social stability might be useful to identify potential divisions of vote on such issues. 
The preference of political regime might point out a vote related to specific political parties with 
continuist character, whilst the monarchy as guarantor of social stability might provide insights 
about the role of monarchy after the dictatorship in the new democratic context. 
Secondly, by using data of 1994 two variables related to the confidence in the monarchy and 
the level of satisfaction during Francoism have been used. These two variables are conceptually 
different to previous ones. The monarchy variable measures the general level of confidence, 
which can be interpreted as social support for the monarchy. Moreover, the level of satisfaction 
during Francoism is strongly related to the idea of sociological Francoism. Several authors 
(Pintor, 1982; Montero & Torcal, 1990) explain sociological Francoism as the persistent social 
acceptance and the absence of political culture of the majority of Spaniards during the 
authoritarian regime and the democratic era due to the influence of the years of the 
dictatorship. From another point of view (see Recio, 2004), sociological Francoism persists even 
now as a network of interests and political support around the Francoist ideology and it owns a 
large part of the economic and political power. The variable about the level of satisfaction during 
Francoism can be used as rough index of the concept of sociological Francoism concerning the 
ideas of acceptance of an authoritarian regime and absence of opposition to it. 
Regarding the territorial analysis, it has been seen that voting patterns varied regionally 
according to variables such as income. Nonetheless, despite the regional variations of voting 
patterns on variables related to the typical class cleavage or to conservative issues, the territorial 
cleavage in Spain is based on the territorial organization of the State.  
Through the evolution of the Spanish party system by the 1980s, the PSOE and the AP/PP 
become the main parties, transforming the party system into a two-party system. However, the 
party system was imperfect due to the presence of peripheral nationalisms. In regions with 
nationalist movements, variables such as birthplace largely influenced voting patterns. 
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However, even though the vote in Catalonia or the Basque Country was influenced by the 
underlying nationalism, the problem of the territorial organization could have influenced the 
vote nationally by defining the vote between the two main national parties. For this reason, a 
scaling variable of agreement with different forms of territorial organization in Spain has been 
selected and it has been included in a multinomial logit model of voting alternatives between 
the PSOE and the AP/PP using data from the survey of 1985. 
Furthermore, data of the survey of 1985 enable us to make a first approximation to the 
monarchy issue. In this case, the selected variable is a dummy variable related to the capacity 
of the monarchy to ensure order and stability, where 1 is agree and 0 is disagree. Although this 
variable does not conceptually reflect the level of support for the monarchy, it provides an 
approach about the role of the monarchy after the dictatorship. These results are particularly 
useful because Franco conferred the role of political continuity to the King Juan Carlos I and, as 
Powell stated (1997: 84), he served as institutional link between the authoritarian past and the 
democratic future. The question chosen can illustrate the level of acceptance of the monarchy 
as an institution that guarantees social stability concerning voting patterns. However, the 
interpretation about this variable is quite wide; therefore, the most feasible interpretations will 
be debated later according to the results obtained. 
Finally, in the model of 1985, a variable related to preferences of political regime has been 
included. This variable is formed by 1 (democracy not preferable), 2 (in certain cases 
dictatorship) and 3 (democracy preferable). The selected variable will help us to reveal if a 
significant association exists between the grade of support for democracy or dictatorship and 
voting patterns. As before, this variable is related to the idea of continuity of the old regime and 
support for democracy. 
The data of CIS 2084 of 1994 provides another two variables related to previous concepts. Firstly, 
the monarchy but, this time, in a scale from 0 to 10 regarding the level of confidence in relation 
with the monarchy. Secondly, a scale level of satisfaction with Francoism from 1 to 5. In this 
case, the variable about monarchy might be read as social support for the monarchy in an overall 
context and it can reveal the persistence of the monarchy-republic cleavage on voting patterns. 
As has been discussed previously, the variable of satisfaction during Francoism is related to the 
idea of sociological Francoism, that is, the acceptance of the authoritarian regime. 
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3.4.1 Voting Patterns in 1985 
Before analysing voting patterns in 1985, the new variables provided by the data of 1985 have 
been included in a multiple linear regression where the dependent variable is the ideological 
range of respondents from 1 to 10. Monarchy, territorial organization and democracy support 
have been modelled together with the most relevant explanatory variables in previous models: 
religion and income. 
 
 
 
The significant variables of the model are the religiosity level and income, as well as the new 
variable about the territorial organization. Both the support of democracy and the monarchy 
variable seem not to be significant for explaining individuals' ideological positions. The goodness 
of fit of the model is 0.20 according to the adjusted squared index. 
The religiosity level continues to be the explanatory variable with higher estimation (1.00), 
meaning that, at greater levels of religiosity, the individuals' ideology moves towards right-wing 
positions. The variable about territorial organization is below religiosity and its estimate is 0.29. 
This result shows that right-wing positions are related to the preference for a more centralised 
state. Likewise, income level continued to define the ideological positions in 1985. The 
estimation of the model for the income variable is 0.10. The income estimate in this model is 
slightly greater than in the model of 1978. This result shows that income, typically related to the 
class cleavage, might have persisted and strengthened during the 1980s. The negotiations 
between trade unions and the government for the former to become institutionalised resulted 
in a period with general strikes and in the rupture between trade unions and political parties 
(see Hamann & Martínez, 2003; Luque, 2012). This factors could have been influenced by the 
salience of the income, typically associated to the class cleavage, on ideological positions. 
The monarchy variable is irrelevant in this model. Therefore, the role of the monarchy as 
guarantor of order and social stability does not divide the ideological positions of society along 
left-wing and right-wing. Likewise, the preference between democracy or an authoritarian 
 
Ideological self-placement in 1985 (1 Left-wing, 10 Right-wing) 
Variable Estimate (Std. Error) Significance (Code) 
Intercept 
Religion 
Territory 
Democracy 
Monarchy 
Income 
1.86 (0.42) 
1.00 (0.09) 
0.29 (0.06) 
-0.18 (0.10) 
0.04 (0.13) 
0.10 (0.04) 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.071 
0.753 
0.015 * 
Table 12. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1441 (N= 1199).  R squared 0.20. Adjusted R squared 
0.20. Confidence level 0.95. Significance codes *** for 0,000 – 0.001, ** for 0.001 – 0.01, * for 0.01 – 
0.05. 
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regime does not influence the ideological self-placement. Consequently, the type of political 
system and the institutional role of the monarchy do not seem to be significant in the Spanish 
ideological positions of 1985. Nonetheless, the typical social and class-cleavage issues such as 
religion, territory and income continue to define the ideological self-placement. 
The same explanatory variables have been included in a multinomial logit model of voting 
patterns. The AP, the CDS, the PSOE and the PCE have been selected as alternatives and the 
results of the AP and the PSOE are displayed as reference. As it has been done previously, the 
aim is to reveal the variations of vote related to the aforementioned variables since they could 
differ from the ideological self-placement. Table 13 shows the results obtained: 
 
Table 13. Voting patterns in 1985. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1441(N= 1199).  McFadden R squared 0.15. 
Frequency of Parties: AP 0.21 CDS 0.10 PCE 0.05 PSOE 0.62. Log-Likelihood: -391.16. Confidence level 0.95. 
Significance codes *** for 0,000 – 0.001, ** for 0.001 – 0.01, * for 0.01 – 0.05. Explanation about variables and 
methodology in appendix 3. 
All explanatory variables, except the democracy or dictatorship support, have significance with 
some alternative for both the PSOE and the AP. The goodness of fit of the model is 0.15 for such 
variables. 
Taking the PSOE as reference level, the religiosity level influences the vote division among all 
other alternatives. The greatest religious distance with the PSOE voters lies with the AP voters. 
The estimate is 1.63 for AP voters compared to PSOE voters. Likewise, the CDS voters are more 
 Reference level PSOE Reference level AP 
Party: Variable  Estimate (Std. Error) Significance (code) Estimate (Std. Error) Significance (code) 
AP: (intercept) 
CDS: (intercept) 
PCE: (intercept) 
PSOE: (intercept) 
AP: (Religion) 
CDS: (Religion) 
PCE: (Religion) 
PSOE: (Religion) 
AP: (Territory) 
CDS: (Territory) 
PCE: (Territory) 
PSOE: (Territory) 
AP: (Democracy) 
CDS: (Democracy) 
PCE: (Democracy) 
PSOE: (Democracy) 
AP: (Income) 
CDS: (Income) 
PCE: (Income) 
PSOE: (Income) 
AP: (Monarchy role) 
CDS: (Monarchy role) 
PCE: (Monarchy role) 
PSOE: (Monarchy role) 
-7.62 (1.20) 
-5.28 (1.34) 
2.11 (1.44) 
- 
1.63 (0.26) 
0.89 (0.28) 
-0.86 (0.33) 
- 
0.68 (0.16) 
0.33 (0.19) 
-0.70 (0.25) 
- 
-0.09 (0.21) 
-0.18 (0.26) 
-0.30 (0.36) 
- 
0.28 (0.09) 
0.24 (0.10) 
0.08 (0.14) 
- 
-0.75 (0.28) 
-0.06 (0.36) 
-1.00 (0.45) 
- 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.143 
- 
0.000 *** 
0.001 ** 
0.010 * 
- 
0.000 *** 
0.090 
0.006 ** 
- 
0.660 
0.485 
0.392 
- 
0.001 ** 
0.023 * 
0.557 
- 
0.008 ** 
0.868 
0.026 * 
- 
- 
2.33 (1.60) 
9.72 (1.83) 
7.62 (1.20) 
- 
-0.73 (0.34) 
-2.50 (0.41) 
-1.63 (0.26) 
- 
-0.35 (0.22) 
-1.38 (0.29) 
-0.68 (0.16) 
- 
-0.09 (0.28) 
-0.21 (0.40) 
0.09 (0.21) 
- 
-0.03 (0.12) 
-0.19 (0.16) 
-0.28 (0.09) 
- 
-0.69 (0.40) 
-0.24 (0.51) 
0.75 (0.28) 
- 
0.145 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.034 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.119 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.749 
0.595 
0.660 
- 
0.747 
0.235 
0.001 *** 
- 
0.082  
0.633 
0.008 ** 
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religious than PSOE voters. Nonetheless, the religiosity level decreases in PCE voters compared 
to the PSOE voters.   
On the other hand, taking the AP as reference level, the influence of religion still remains, 
compared to PSOE and PCE voters. However, the religiosity level does not produce differences 
between AP and CDS voters. As would be expected, the PCE voters have the largest negative 
estimate (-2.50), whilst the PSOE has -1.63. It can be seen that both the AP and the PCE were 
the most polarized alternatives regarding the religious issue. 
It is the first time in this research that religion is introduced as a distinctive explanatory variable 
of voting patterns nationally. Previously, it has been used to analyse the ideological self-
placement in 1978 and the voting patterns in Catalonia, showing strong significance as well. The 
results illustrate the remarkable significance of religion in Spanish voting patterns, since it 
divides vote preferences among the major political parties.  
Furthermore, these results are in accord with previous research (Torcal & Montero, 1997; Calvo, 
Martínez & Montero, 2006) that state the persistence of religion as an influencing factor on the 
Spanish party system during the 1980s and onwards. Concretely, the study of Calvo, Martínez 
and Montero (2006) points out that religion in Spain, unlike in Portugal, also affected the 
ideological self-placement. Portugal is used as comparative case because of its similarities. Table 
12 shows the same insights about the ideological identities of Spaniards in 1985. 
The new variable about preferences of territorial organization shows compelling results. If the 
PSOE is taken as reference, the preferences about the territorial organization affected the voter 
alignments for the AP and the PCE voters. The likelihood of voting for the AP compared to the 
PSOE rises as the preferences for a more centralised State increase. On the other hand, the 
likelihood of voting for the PCE compared to the PSOE rises as the preferences for lower levels 
of centralisation increase. The territorial variable does not seem to influence the CDS compared 
to the PSOE.
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If the AP is used as reference level, territorial preferences affected the vote for the PSOE and 
the PCE compared to the AP. The likelihood of voting for the PSOE and the PCE compared to the 
AP increases in preferences of a less centralised State. Moreover, the likelihood is higher for PCE 
voters than for PSOE voters. As in the case of the PSOE, the territorial preferences, apparently, 
do not influence the choice of voting for the CDS or the AP. 
The new variable about preferences of territorial organization represents another conceptual 
approach about the territorial issue in Spain. As has been seen previously, the vote was 
fragmented by peripheral nationalisms in regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, 
where variables as birthplace played an important role in the voting patterns. Nonetheless, as 
has been discussed in the historical review, the presence of peripheral nationalisms has also 
encouraged an ongoing debate about which territorial organization is more suitable for Spain.  
The results displayed in Table 13 show that this debate influenced voting patterns in 1985 at a 
national level. Likewise, some other reasons have been given for explaining such debate. 
According to Stapell (2007), Spain developed several regional, national or mixed identities after 
Francoism, not only within or caused by nationalist regions, such as Catalonia and the Basque 
Country, but in all regions of Spain. From Stapell's point of view, this might be caused by a 
response to the Francoist legacy, the formation of the autonomic State and the modern 
supranationalism as a result of the accession to the European Union (Stapell, 2007: 181-182). A 
previous research conducted by Bollen and Medrano (1998) highlights some of such insights by 
showing several levels of national identity regionally. 
As seen in Table 12, the variable of preferences towards democracy or dictatorship does not 
affect the voting patterns of any party in the model of 1985. Consequently, neither the 
ideological self-placement in 1985 along right-wing and left-wing identities nor the voting 
patterns were divided by an eventual democracy-dictatorship cleavage after Francoism. This 
result contrasts with previous research related to a similar study case. According to conclusions 
of Katz and Alvarez (2009) about Chilean voting patterns in the 2005 election, preferences of 
democracy influenced the choice between the Chilean political alternatives. However, 
preferences about form of government in our model are not directly linked to the support or 
not for Francoism, understood as a social and value system. This approach to Francoism will be 
studied in the following chapter. 
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Concerning the income variable, if the PSOE is taken as reference, it has significance for 
alternatives of the CDS and the AP. The income appears not to affect the choice between the 
PSOE and the PCE in the model. The estimates related to income of the CDS and the AP 
compared to the PSOE are almost equal, 0.24 and 0.28 respectively. The likelihood of voting for 
the AP or the CDS compared to the PSOE increases in higher income ranges. If the AP is selected 
as reference, the results only show significance for the PSOE choice. Remarkably, the PCE 
alternative concerning the income is not significant compared to the AP. 
At this point, it can be observed that income continued to influence voting patterns by 1985. In 
this case, there is an obvious division between the PSOE, on the one hand, and the CDS and the 
AP. This result differs partially from data of the model of 1978, where income only influenced 
the AP alternative.  
Moreover, income is not significant for choosing the PCE compared to the PSOE and the AP. This 
result matches the conclusions of the model for Catalonia in 1983. Likewise, the vote for the PCE 
is also marginal (0.05) compared to the PSOE (0.62). The PSOE alternative attracted the largest 
part of the population with lower income levels, whilst the CDS and the AP attracted higher 
income ranges. The vote for the PCE concerning income was not mainly distributed neither in 
low nor high income levels; by contrast, the vote for the PCE seems to be mainly based on social 
issues, as the religiosity variable shows. 
Finally, the dummy variable concerning the role of the monarchy as guarantor of order and 
stability displays interesting results. Taking the PSOE as reference level, this variable is significant 
for the AP and the PCE. Both estimates are negative and have a value of -0.75 for the AP and -
1.00 for the PCE. If the AP is taken as reference, the monarchy variable is only significant for the 
PSOE alternative. In this case, the monarchy variable does not reach the minimum significance 
for influencing the vote between the CDS and the AP. 
Looking closer at the meaning of this variable and the results obtained, it can be observed that 
neither the AP nor the PCE supporters agreed with the role of the monarchy as guarantor of 
order and stability. This idea could have influenced their voting choice compared to the PSOE, 
according to the alternatives set as references. By taking into account their ideologies, this might 
be explained by the polarisation of both of them at opposite ends on the ideological spectrum. 
The AP has been pointed out by some authors (see Gunther, 1988) as a party which attracted 
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votes from Francoist sectors of the population. Therefore, some voters of the AP might have 
lacked confidence in the ability of the monarchy to ensure social stability.  
On the other hand, the results related to the PCE are more understandable because of its 
republican and Marxist character. It is interesting to note that the vote was not significantly 
opposed to the role of the monarchy as guarantor of social stability; by contrast, of all the 
alternatives analysed, it is the alternative with the largest support in such a role. This result 
contrasts with the performance of the PSOE concerning the monarchy before the dictatorship. 
As it has been seen, according to Andrade (1979) the PSOE changed its ideology from pure 
Marxist ideals to more moderate positions during the first years of the 21st century. According 
to some historians (Lamelas, 2003; Blanco & Andrade, 2010), over the democratic transition, the 
PSOE changed again its ideological position by accepting the new government model, including 
the monarchy, and approaching European social-democracy. The acceptance of the monarchy 
by the PSOE could have been reflected in the moderation of their voters regarding the 
monarchy. 
3.4.2 Sociological Francoism, monarchy endorsement and voting patterns in 1994 
In this chapter, two new variables related to monarchy and Francoism have been included by 
using data of 1994. As has been stated in the introduction, the variable about monarchy is, in 
this case, a confidence scale from 0 to 10. This variable is conceptually different to the previous 
one and it intends to be a rough index of the endorsement of the monarchy. 
Additionally, the concept of sociological Francoism defined previously has been approached 
using a variable about the satisfaction with the Francoist era from 1 to 5. Likewise, the 
satisfaction with the democratic transition has been analysed using the same scale. 
Satisfaction with Francoism and with the democratic transition have been modelled in a multiple 
linear regression taking into account religiosity, endorsement of the monarchy and income. The 
purpose is to reveal causal relationships between the new variables and the rest of the 
explanatory variables before setting up the final model of voting patterns, as well as to illustrate 
new insights. 
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Before explaining the results derived from the aforementioned models, it is appropriate to 
discuss briefly the distribution of satisfaction with Francoism and the democratic transition, 
which will help to draw a first point of view about the issue: 
 
Francoism 
 
Democratic Transition 
 Very satisfied Satisfied Neutral Unsatisfied Very unsatisfied Total 
Very satisfied 1.04 1.41 0.56 0.84 0.32 4.17 
Satisfied 2.45 12.25 2.25 1.69 0.08 18.72 
Neutral 1.57 9.79 4.67 0.92 0.16 17.11 
Unsatisfied 4.11 20.24 1.93 1.33 0.08 27.69 
Very unsatisfied 5.76 8.91 1.89 0.92 0.48 17.96 
Total 14.93 52.96 11.3 5.7 1.12 86.01/85.65 a 
Francoism is almost equally distributed from very unsatisfied to satisfied, but only 4.17% of the 
respondents were very satisfied with the Francoist era. By contrast, the great majority of 
responses about the democratic transition (79.19%) are gathered in categories from neutral 
towards very satisfied. On a subjective basis, respondents were mainly more satisfied with the 
democratic transition than with Francoism but, neutrality or satisfaction with Francoism was not 
marginal since 40% of the respondents were neutral, satisfied or very satisfied with the Francoist 
era.  
A closer look at the main response rates reveals that 20.24% of the respondents were 
dissatisfied with Francoism but satisfied with the democratic transition. Nonetheless, the second 
largest rate (12.5%) is for those satisfied with both Francoism and the democratic transition. The 
third largest rate was 9.79% for those neutral with Francoism and satisfied with the democratic 
transition. Overall, Table 14 shows that, generally, the population was satisfied with the 
democratic transition and was divided about the satisfaction with Francoism. 
The following table displays the results of the model carried out on both scales of satisfaction 
concerning religiosity level, endorsement of the monarchy and income: 
 
 
Table 14. Frequencies (%) of satisfaction with Francoism and the democratic transition in 1994. a Francoism 
has an error rate of 13.99% that includes not available data, not response and approximation errors. The 
Democratic Transition has an error rate of 14.35% that includes not available data, not response and 
approximation errors. CIS 2084. N= 2485. 
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In the first model, it can be observed that the religiosity level and the endorsement of the 
monarchy affect the levels of satisfaction with the Francoist era positively. Satisfaction increase 
with Francoism is remarkably large in the religiosity variable (0.53). The monarchy variable, 
although significant, is quite small (0.02) compared to the religiosity level. Income seems not to 
be an explanatory variable of satisfaction with Francoism. 
On the other hand, the satisfaction with the democratic transition seems to be just positively 
affected by the endorsement of the monarchy and income. The religiosity level does not 
influence neither negatively nor positively the satisfaction with the democratic transition. As in 
the previous model, the increase of satisfaction with the democratic transition is fairly small in 
regard to monarchy (0.07) and income (0.06). 
It should be emphasised that the results in Table 15 do not compare both cases, only the level 
of satisfaction in both cases concerning the explanatory variables is analysed. As a general point, 
even though a logistic model comparing Francoism and the democratic transition as alternatives 
has not been carried out, religion seems to be a key explanatory variable of the differences 
between satisfaction with Francoism and the democratic transition. Satisfaction with both 
government forms rises as the endorsement of the monarchy increases, whilst the income level 
seems to increase slightly as satisfaction with the democratic transition grows.  
Finally, voting patterns have been modelled taking the PSOE and the Partido Popular (PP; 
People's Party) (refounding of the AP in 1989) as reference levels. A new party called Izquierda 
Unida (IU; United Left), constituted in 1986 as a federation of the PCE, the PSUC and the IR, 
Level of satisfaction with the democratic transition (1 Very unsatisfied, 5 Very satisfied) 
Variable Estimate (Std. Error) Significance (Code) 
Intercept 
Religion 
Monarchy 
Income 
3.16 (0.10) 
0.01 (0.03) 
0.07 (0.01) 
0.06 (0.02) 
0.000 *** 
0.617 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
R squared 0.10. Adjusted R squared 0.10. 
R squared 0.05. Adjusted R squared 0.05.  
Table 15. Prepared by the author based on CIS 2084 (N= 2485). 
Level of satisfaction with the Francoist era (1 Very unsatisfied, 5 Very satisfied) 
Variable Estimate (Std. Error) Significance (Code) 
Intercept 
Religion 
Monarchy 
Income 
1.26 (0.15) 
0.53 (0.05) 
0.02 (0.01) 
0.00 (0.02) 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
0.001 ** 
0.672 
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among others, has also been included. Vote alternatives have been linked with religion, income, 
endorsement of the monarchy and satisfaction with Francoism. Due to the possible inference 
between satisfaction with Francoism and the religiosity level, two models are displayed: one 
with the religion variable and one without it. Table 16 shows the results obtained: 
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Voting patterns in 1994 
 With religion Without religion 
  Reference level PSOE Reference level PP Reference level PSOE Reference level PP 
 
Party: Variable 
Estimate  
(Std. Error) 
Significance 
(code) 
Estimate  
(Std. Error) 
Significance 
(code) 
Estimate 
 (Std. Error) 
Significance 
(code) 
Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
Significance 
(code) 
IU: (Intercept) 
PP: (Intercept) 
PSOE: (Intercept) 
IU: (Religion) 
PP: (Religion) 
PSOE: (Religion) 
IU: (Income) 
PP: (Income) 
PSOE: (Income) 
IU: (Monarchy) 
PP: (Monarchy) 
PSOE: (Monarchy) 
IU: (Francoism) 
PP: (Francoism) 
PSOE: (Francoism) 
1.04 (0.69) 
-0.65 (0.59) 
- 
-0.74 (0.19) 
0.71 (0.16) 
- 
0.07 (0.08) 
0.39 (0.06) 
- 
-0.26 (0.04) 
-0.05 (0.03) 
- 
-0.20 (0.10) 
0.77 (0.07) 
- 
0.137 
0.266 
- 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.361 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.000 *** 
0.185 
- 
0.060  
0.000 *** 
- 
1.69 (0.79) 
- 
0.65 (0.59) 
-1.46 (0.23) 
- 
-0.71 (0.16) 
-0.31 (0.09) 
- 
-0.39 (0.06) 
-0.20 (0.04) 
- 
-0.05 (0.03) 
-0.98 (0.12) 
- 
-0.77 (0.07) 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.185 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.000 *** 
-0.77 (0.54) 
1.05 (0.42) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.11 (0.07) 
0.34 (0.06) 
- 
-0.28 (0.03) 
-0.00 (0.03) 
- 
-0.29 (0.10) 
0.84 (0.07) 
- 
0.153 
0.013 * 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.154 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.000 *** 
0.817 
- 
0.005 ** 
0.000 *** 
- 
-1.83 (0.58) 
- 
-1.05 (0.42) 
- 
- 
- 
-0.23 (0.08) 
- 
-0.34 (0.06) 
-0.27 (0.04) 
- 
0.00 (0.37) 
-1.13 (0.11) 
- 
- 0.84 (0.07) 
0.001 ** 
- 
0.013 * 
- 
- 
- 
0.008 ** 
- 
0.000 *** 
0.000 *** 
- 
0.817  
0.000 *** 
- 
0.000 *** 
 Mc Fadden R squared 0.20. Log-Likelihood -640.28. Mc Fadden R squared 0.16. Log-Likelihood -690.7. 
   Table 16. Voting Patterns in 1994. Prepared by the author based on CIS 2084 (N= 2485). Frequency of parties PSOE 0.50 PP 0.21 IU 0.13 
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In the first model, all variables have some level of significance with some alternative for the two 
reference levels. If the PSOE is taken as reference level, religion affects the vote for the PP (0.71) 
and the IU (-0.74). The likelihood of voting for the IU decreases in higher religiosity levels, whilst 
it increases for the PP compared to the PSOE. This concurs with previous findings: the PSOE 
occupies an intermediate position between the right-wing (PP/AP) and the far-left (IU/PCE) 
regarding the religious issue. Income is statistically significant for the PP alternative compared 
to the PSOE. The value of the estimate (0.39) is similar to those seen in the model of 1985. Like 
the results displayed in Table 13, the IU vote is not significant compared to the PSOE. 
Endorsement of the monarchy affects the vote for the IU compared to the PSOE. The likelihood 
of voting for the IU decreases as the support of the monarchy increases. Satisfaction with 
Francoism generates interesting results: the probability of voting for the PP compared to the 
PSOE increases as the satisfaction with the Francoist era grows. 
Regarding the second model, the religion variable has not been included and the results showed 
a goodness of fit of 0.16, 0.04 less than in the previous model. Moreover, the estimates have 
not changed significantly with respect to the previous model. The major variance lies in the fact 
that, by removing the religion variable, the estimation of satisfaction with Francoism results 
significant for the IU alternative compared to the PSOE. 
Broadly, the religiosity level still played a remarkable role in 1994 by dividing the vote of all main 
parties. However, according to McDonough, Barnes and Pina (1998), the influence of religion on 
ideological identities and satisfaction with Francoism was decreasing over the democratic 
transition. As has been analysed in Table 13 and Table 15, and consistent with the conclusions 
of McDonough, Barnes and Pina (1998: 28-30), the attitudes towards democracy appear not to 
be significantly affected by religion or the satisfaction with Francoism. Consequently, the 
influence of a democracy-dictatorship cleavage on voting patterns and ideological identities is 
barely feasible. By contrast, the influence of Francoism, understood as a cultural and social 
system strongly related to religion and other issues (see Pintor, 1982; Montero & Torcal, 1990; 
McDonough, Barnes & Pina, 1998; Recio, 2004), seems to have influenced Spanish politics during 
the democratic transition and onwards. 
Furthermore, endorsement of the monarchy does not affect the voting choice of the two main 
parties, the PSOE and the PP. By contrast, it is significant when voting for the IU compared to 
the PSOE and the PP. It can be observed that the royalism ceased to affect, negatively or 
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positively, the voting choice between the main parties. Only the vote for the main far-left party 
(IU) was negatively affected. This result contrasts with the voting patterns before and during the 
Second Republic, but it could related to the two-party system in the 19th century. Therefore, 
the republic-monarchy cleavage could be eventually considered a salient cleavage and not a 
lifelong cleavage, as are religion or territory. 
 
3.5 Discussion  
Throughout the analysis of the ideological identities and the voting patterns after the 
dictatorship, several findings and insights have been obtained regarding the significance of the 
factors stated by several authors in chapter 1 and the data in chapter 2. 
By studying the data of 1978, we can observe the strong importance of religion and the 
willingness to join a strike for defining ideological self-placement to the detriment of income. 
This underlines the salience of social issues rather than a pure class division related to income 
level on the ideological axis shortly after the dictatorship (see post-materialist process in Torcal 
& Montero, 1997; Linz & Montero, 1999). As Table 7 and 8 show, the income level and the 
occupational category are only relevant for defining the vote for the AP, whilst the occupational 
category is equally distributed among the remaining political parties. Likewise, the voting 
patterns in 1978 were divided on this ideological axis among four political parties ideologically 
well-differentiated: the PCE (far-left), the PSOE (left), the UCD (centre-right) and the AP (far-
right). 
Unlike variables such as religion, that remain significant in all the analysis, income and other 
indexes related to class varied according to year and region. For example, income influenced the 
vote for the AP in Madrid in 1978, but was irrelevant in Andalusia and Castile, where ideology 
defined the voting patterns. By contrasting the distributions in figure 6 and the results in Table 
13, it can be observed that lower income rates did not affect the right-wing self-placement and 
the vote for the AP in Castile and Andalusia compared to Madrid. Similarly, the vote influenced 
by occupational categories varied in the Basque Country and Catalonia. In the Basque Country, 
the PCE and the PSOE voters were lower-level professionals, whilst in Catalonia the PCE voters 
were upper-level employees compared to the PSOE. Consequently, the vote for right-wing or 
left-wing parties could have been influenced by income rates in those richer regions (Madrid, 
Basque Country or Catalonia) and by ideological issues in those poorer regions (Castile or 
Andalusia).  
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The vote for the PCE was marginal and not strongly linked to the income level. For instance, in 
1985 the PCE vote was not influenced by income compared to the AP, whilst the vote for the 
PSOE was. It can be observed that the PSOE was the party with the largest support among the 
lower-level occupational categories and low income levels. 
Although income as voting explanation was significant only in certain cases, it seems to gain 
importance over the years, leading to a greater disparity between left-wing and right-wing 
parties. In 1985, income influenced the vote for the AP and the CDS compared to the PSOE (see 
Table 13). In 1994, income influenced the vote for the IU and the PSOE compared to the PP (see 
Table 16), but also the vote for the IU compared to the PSOE in the second model. It is important 
to note that the increasing significance of the income level coincided concurrently with the 
merging of political parties and the development of an imperfect two-party system.  
Concerning the centre-periphery cleavage, it has been studied in two conceptual dimensions. 
Firstly, the divisions of vote regarding birthplace in Catalonia and the Basque Country are highly 
significant. A clear division of vote between nationalist and national parties existed, which 
largely intersects with religion or class as explanatory variables of vote. Secondly, as previous 
works have stated (see Bollen & Medrano, 1998; Stapell, 2007), the preferences regarding 
territorial organization are also highly remarkable for explaining the social context and the vote 
choice nationally after the dictatorship. As Table 13 shows, the PCE voter tended towards 
decentralisation, whilst the AP voter tended towards centralisation. The PSOE and the CDS 
voters occupied central positions regarding this issue, but the PSOE voters were more in favour 
of the decentralisation than the CDS voters. 
The monarchy-republic cleavage has been studied under two ideas highlighted over the 
research: the role of the monarchy after the dictatorship and the endorsement of it. The role of 
the monarchy as guarantor of order and social stability was not significant for defining 
ideological self-placement, but it affected the voting patterns in 1985. The AP and the PCE voters 
mostly disagreed about the role of the monarchy, whilst voters of the major parties (the PSOE 
and the CDS) agreed on it. Moreover, the endorsement of the monarchy seemed to encourage 
the satisfaction with both Francoism and the democratic transition, but the endorsement of the 
monarchy was negatively linked to the vote for the IU in 1994 compared the PSOE and the PP. 
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In general, the monarchy was inconsequential in moderate positions of the ideological axis for 
defining ideology or vote. This is confirmed by observing that the monarchy affected the vote 
negatively only in far-left parties, such as the PCE or the IU, and in far-right parties such as the 
AP. Consequently, the influence of the monarchy as explanatory variable was confined to small 
and ideologically polarized alternatives. 
Finally, the influence of Francoism on ideology and vote has been studied from two approaches. 
Firstly, by assuming that Francoism encouraged a dictatorship-democracy cleavage, understood 
as a form of government, and which affected vote and ideological identities. Secondly, by taking 
into account the effect of the dictatorship on society as a social and value system, what has been 
named sociological Francoism (see Pintor, 1982; Montero & Torcal, 1990; Recio, 2004). 
The results reveal that preferences about form of government did not have any effect on 
ideological identities or voting patterns in 1985. By contrast, the concept of sociological 
Francoism was strongly influenced primarily by religion and, in turn, sociological Francoism 
mainly encouraged the vote for the PP compared to left-wing parties in 1994. Consequently, the 
Francoist era affected post-dictatorship voting patterns and ideological identities by involving 
specific positions on life-long cleavages, as high religiosity levels, rather than the endorsement 
of an authoritarian regime. 
Overall Conclusions 
Throughout the study of the pre-dictatorship era and the years after its end, it can be observed 
how several determinant factors of Spanish politics have remained unchanged. Nonetheless, 
those specific factors have varied in their importance and have taken various forms by region 
and over the years. 
Concurring with previous research (see Torcal & Montero, 1997; McDonough, Barnes & Pina, 
1998; Coller, 2004) and this study, one of the most salient cleavages is the religion and every 
respect related to it. Over the analysis, we have seen the high influence of it on defining 
ideological identities, vote and the development of the party system, before and after the 
dictatorship. 
The centre-periphery cleavage has also been highly relevant for the definition of Spanish politics 
during centuries. This cleavage affected both the vote and the ideological identities within 
nationalist regions and in the whole country, by encouraging people to vote for nationalist 
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parties and by opening an ongoing debate about territorial organization, likely caused by the 
reshaping of post-dictatorship territorial identities (see Bollen & Medrano, 1998). 
The class cleavage was and remains determinant when voting in some cases. From the history 
of the pre-dictatorship era (see Linz, 1967: 263) and the vote distributions of the Second 
Republic, the class issues largely intersected with more salient cleavages, such as religion or 
territory. The ambiguous positions of the PSOE (the main class-oriented party) about 
nationalism or the presence of the traditionalism and the CEDA in certain poor regions and social 
sectors in contrast to anarcho-syndicalism or socialism, confirm such conclusions. Likewise, the 
analysis conducted after the dictatorship seems to reveal that income significance was a weak 
explanatory variable in certain cases. For example, it differed depending on region in 1978, and 
voting for the PCE was not affected by income level but it was strongly influenced by religion. 
Monarchy was, likely, the less salient long-term explanatory variable of vote and ideology among 
those aforementioned. The monarchy-republic cleavage played an important role before and 
after the constitution of the Second Republic, but the new party system focused rapidly on issues 
related to religion, territory or class. The voting patterns for the main parties after the 
dictatorship were clearly not influenced by issues related to the monarchy. Neither the role of 
the monarchy, nor its endorsement, affected the vote for the PSOE, the CDS and, later, the PP. 
After the dictatorship, rejection of the monarchy arose from far-left and far-right parties 
partially close to Francoism. 
Concerning the role of Francoism for defining the post-dictatorship party system, the analysis 
has revealed that no division of attitudes towards democracy or dictatorship (understood as a 
form of government) existed regarding voting patterns and ideological identities in 1985. By 
contrast, Francoism, understood as a social and value system (Pintor, 1982; Montero & Torcal, 
1990; Recio, 2004), affected both voting patterns and ideological identities. Religion was pointed 
out as strongly correlated to sociological Francoism and voting patterns, in turn, were also 
divided by sociological Francoism in 1994. 
These final insights show that Francoism erupted by holding specific ideological positions on the 
aforementioned social cleavages and that such specific positions remained together as a set of 
ideals that influenced Spanish voting patterns during the democracy. 
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Appendix 1. CIS 1157 
 
Data treatment of CIS Number 1157 July 1978 
Stratified sampling N = 5350 nationally 
Variables 
P.14. What party would you vote in next general elections? (Nominal) 
AP (1) PSOE (2) PCE (3) UCD (4) Other Parties (5, 6, 7, 8) NA (9). 
AP (1), PSOE (2), PCE (3), UCD (4) set as alternatives in multinomial model. Other Parties (5, 6, 
7, 8) set as NA. 
P.16. We would like to know if you would be willing to carry on some of following actions to 
defend and make known your point of view about some issue of greatest importance for the 
future of the country. (Dummy) 
Participate in a strike. I will (1) I will not (2) Not response (3) Do not know (4). 
I will not (2) sets as 0, Not response (3) and Do not know (4) set as NA. 
P.53. Please, place yourself on following scale according your political belief. (Ordinal) 
Far-left (1) Left (2) Centre-left (3) Centre (4) Centre-right (5) Right (6) Far-Right (7) Not 
response (8) Do not know (9). 
Not response (8) and Do not know (9) set as NA. 
P.57. How old are you? (Discrete) 
Unaltered.  
P.59. How do you consider yourself on religious issues? (Nominal) 
Practicing Catholic (1), non-practicing Catholic (2), other religions (3), non-believer (4), 
indifferent (5), not response (6). 
Processed as dummy. Non-practicing Catholic (2), non-believer (4) and indifferent (5) set as 0. 
Not response (6) and other religions (3) set as NA. 
P.61. How much is the income of your household monthly? (Ordinal)  
Over 85000 pta. per month (1) 66000-85000 (2) 46000-65000 (3) 36000-45000 (4) 26000-
35000 (5) 19000-25000 (6) 12000-18000 (7) 6000-11000 (8) up to 6000 pta. Per month (9) NA 
(0). 
Processed as inverse ordinal variable. Up to 6000 pta. per month (1) - … - Over 85000 pta. per 
month (9). 
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Appendix 2. CIS 1276 
 
Data Treatment of CIS Number 1276 April 1981 
Stratified sampling N = 964 Basque Country and Navarre 
Variables 
P.11. Socio-economic background. (Nominal) 
Industry and services entrepreneurs (1), owners and trades (2),  senior executives of 
government and private enterprise (3),  new professionals of computing and marketing (4), 
middle management (5), office clerks and assistants (6), skilled workers (7), unskilled workers 
(8), agricultural businessmen (9),  farmworkers (10), unemployed (11), housework (12), 
student (13), military service (14), retired (15), other (16). 
Processed as Categorical Ordinal. Industry and services entrepreneurs (1), owners and trades 
(2), senior executives of government and private enterprise (3) and agricultural businessmen 
(9) set as 4. New professionals of computing and marketing (4), middle management (5) and 
office clerks and assistants (6) set as 3. Skilled workers (7) sets as 2. Unskilled workers (8) and 
farmworkers (10) set as 1. Unemployed (11), housework (12), student (13), military service 
(14), retired (15) and other (16) set as NA. 
P.12. In which region were you born? (Nominal) 
Basque Country (1), Navarre (2), other region of Spain (3), Abroad (4) 
Basque Country (1) set as 0. Navarre (2) and other region of Spain (3) set as 1. Abroad (4) sets 
as NA. 
P.28 Might you tell us which party would you vote in new general elections?  (Nominal) 
UCD (01) PSOE (02) PCE (03) AP (04) PNV (05) HB (06) EE (07) Other Parties (08, 09, 10, 11) 
blank vote (12) no vote (13) Not response (14). 
UCD (01) PSOE (02) PCE (03) AP (04) PNV (05) HB (06) EE (07) set as alternatives in multinomial 
model.  Other Parties (08, 09, 10, 11) blank vote (12) no vote (13) Not response (14) set as NA. 
 
Appendix 3. CIS 1527 
 
Data Treatment of CIS Number 1527 April 1986 
N = 2399 Catalonia 
Variables 
P.30A. What party would you vote if general elections would take place tomorrow? (Nominal) 
AP (1) CDS (2) CIU (3) ERC (4) PRD (5) PSC/PSOE (6) PSUC/PCE (7)  
AP (1) CDS (2) CIU (3) ERC (4) PSC/PSOE (6) PSUC/PCE (7) set as alternatives in multinomial 
model. PRD (5) sets as NA because it was marginal. 
ORIGEN. Birthplace. (Dummy) 
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Born in Catalonia (1), not born in Catalonia (2) 
Unaltered.  
SITUACIÓN LABORAL Y OCUPACIÓN. Socio-economic background. (Nominal) 
Industry and services entrepreneurs ≥ 6 employees (1), Industry and services entrepreneurs ≤ 
6 employees (2), agricultural self-employed (3), industry and services self-employed (4), 
freelance (5), senior executives of government and private enterprise (6),  middle 
management (7), office clerks and assistants (8), dealers (9), junior employees (10), skilled 
officials (11) skilled workers (12), unskilled workers (13), farmworkers (14), not response (99).  
Processed as Categorical Ordinal. Industry and services entrepreneurs ≥ 6 employees (1), 
Industry and services entrepreneurs ≤ 6 employees (2), agricultural self-employed (3), industry 
and services self-employed (4) and freelance (5) set as 5. Senior executives of government and 
private enterprise (6) and middle management (7) set as 4. Office clerks and assistants (8), 
dealers (9) and junior employees (10) set as 3. Skilled officials (11) and skilled workers (12) set 
as 2. Unskilled workers (13) and farmworkers (14) set as 1. Nor response (99) sets as NA. 
SITUACIÓN Y PRÁCTICA RELIGIOSA. How do you consider yourself on religious issues? (Nominal) 
Practicing Catholic (1), non-practicing Catholic (2), other religions (3), non-believer (4), 
indifferent (5), not response (6). 
Processed as Categorical Ordinal. Practicing Catholic (1) sets as 3. Non-believer (4) and 
indifferent (5) set as 1. Other religions (3) and not response (6) set as NA. 
 
Appendix 4. CIS 1441 
 
Data Treatment of CIS Number 1441 November 1984 
Stratified sampling N= 1199 nationally   
Variables 
P.13. What the following statements is more right?  
Statement 1. Democracy is preferable to any form of government. Agree (1), Disagree (2), Do 
not know (9), Not response (9). 
Statement 2. In some cases the dictatorship can be preferable. Agree (1), Disagree (2), Do not 
know (9), Not response (9). 
Statement 3. Any form government is preferable to democracy. Agree (1), Disagree (2), Do not 
know (9), Not response (9). 
Processed as Ordinal from 3 to 1 where:  
 3 is democracy is always preferable. 
 2 is in some cases democracy or dictatorship. 
 1 democracy is always not preferable. 
 
In 3 option all respondents chose Agree in Statement 1 and Disagree in Statement 2 and 3. 
In 2 option all respondents chose Not Know in Statement 1 and 3, and Agree in Statement 2. 
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In 1 option all respondents chose Agree in 3, Disagree in Statement 1, and Agree or Not Know 
in Statement 2. 
Remaining options set as NA. 
Overall Not available data 23.26% of N=1199. 
P.24. Which of the following state organizations agree more for Spain? (Categorical) 
A central government state without autonomies (1), a state with regions and autonomies like 
currently (2), a state with autonomies and nationalities with greater autonomy (3), a state with 
nationalities and the ability to create independent states (4). 
Processed as inverse ordinal.  A central government state without autonomies (4) … A state 
with nationalities and the ability to create independent states (1). 
P.28. Is following statement right? 
The King is a guarantee of order and stability for the Spanish. Strongly agree (1), Agree (2), 
Disagree (3), Strongly disagree (4), Not Know (8), Not response (9). 
Processed as Dummy. Strongly agree (1) and Agree (2) set as 1. Disagree (3) and Strongly 
disagree (4) set as 0. Not Know (8) and Not response (9) set as NA. 
P.41. What party would you vote if general elections would take place tomorrow? (Nominal) 
AP (01), CDS (02), PSOE (03), PCE (04), Other parties (05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11), No vote (77), 
Not Know (88), Not response (99). 
AP (01), CDS (02), PSOE (03) and PCE (04) set as alternatives in multinomial model. Other 
parties (05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11), No vote (77), Not Know (88) and Not response (99) set as 
NA. 
D.7. How much is the income of your household monthly? (Ordinal) 
Under 15000 pta. per month (1) 15001-30000 (2) 30001-50000 (3) 50001-75000 (4) 75001-
100000 (5) 100001-150000 (6) 150001-200000 (7) Over 200000 pta. per month (8) Not 
response (9). 
Unaltered. Not response (9) sets as NA. 
D.9. How do you consider yourself on religious issues? (Nominal) 
Practicing Catholic (1), non-practicing Catholic (2), other religions (3), non-believer (4), 
indifferent (5), not response (9). 
Processed as Categorical Ordinal. Practicing Catholic (1) sets as 3. Non-believer (4) and 
indifferent (5) set as 1. Other religions (3) and not response (9) set as NA. 
Appendix 5. CIS 2084 
 
Data Treatment of CIS Number 2084 March 1994 
Stratified sampling N= 2485 Nationally. 
Variables 
P.33. P.33A. When you think about the Francoist era or the democratic transition; how do you 
feel? 
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Very satisfied (1), satisfied (2), neutral (3), unsatisfied (4), very unsatisfied (5), not know (6), 
not response (7). 
Processed as inverse ordinal. Very satisfied (5) … Very unsatisfied (6). Not know (6) and not 
response (7) set as NA. 
P.29. To what extent from 0 to 10 do you trust the following institutions: the monarchy. 
(Discrete) 
Unaltered. 
P.49. How do you consider yourself on religious issues? (Nominal) 
Practicing Catholic (1), non-practicing Catholic (2), practicing of other religions (3), non-
practicing of other religions (4), indifferent (5),  non-believer (6),  not response (9). 
Processed as ordinal. Practicing Catholic (1) sets as 3. Indifferent (5) and non-believer (6) set as 
1. Practicing of other religions (3) and non-practicing of other religions (4) set as NA because of 
they were marginal. Not response (9) set as NA.  
P.51. How much is the income of your household monthly? (Ordinal) 
Under 50000 pta. per month (1) 50001-100000 (2) 100001-150000 (3) 150001-200000 (4) 
200001-300000 (5) 300001-400000 (6) 400001-500000 (7) 500001-750000 (8) 750001- 1 
million pta. (9)    Over 1 million pta. per month (10) Not response (99). 
Unaltered. Not response (99) sets as NA. 
P.53. What party did you vote in the 1993 elections? (Nominal) 
IU (02), PP (03), PSOE (04), Other parties (01, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14), blank vote 
(95), Not legal age (96), No vote (97), Do not remember (98), Not response (99). 
IU (02), PP (03) and PSOE (04) set as alternatives in multinomial model. Other parties (01, 05, 
06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14), blank vote (95), Not legal age (96), No vote (97), Do not 
remember (98) and Not response (99) set as NA. 
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